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The use of explosives brings countless benefits to our everyday lives in areas such as 
mining, oil and gas exploration, demolition, and avalanche control. However, because of the 
potential destructive power of explosives, strict safety procedures must be an integral part of any 
explosives operation.  
The goal of this work is to provide a solution to protect against the hazards that accompany 
the general use of explosives, specifically in avalanche control. For this reason, a blast shield was 
designed and tested to protect the Colorado Department of Transportation personnel against these 
unpredictable effects. This document will develop a complete analysis to answer the following 
questions: what are the potential hazards from the detonation of high explosives, what are their 
effects, and how can we protect ourselves against them. To answer these questions theoretical, 
analytical, and numerical calculations were performed. Finally, a full blast shield prototype was 
tested under different simulated operational environments proving its effectiveness as safety 
device. The Colorado Department of Transportation currently owns more than fifteen shields that 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Black powder, a low explosive, is the oldest type of explosive material known. Although 
it gained popularity as gun powder centuries earlier, it began to be used in mining and rock 
blasting for road construction in the 1600s, and two centuries later the development of 
nitroglycerin and dynamite led to advancements such as the construction of road tunnels (ATF 
2016). Nowadays, explosive materials are produced in numerous physical forms for their use in 
mining, engineering, or military applications. In 2013, 6.7 billion pounds of explosives were 
used in the United States alone (ATF 2016). However, because of the inherent destructive power 
of explosives, strict safety procedures must be an integral part of any explosives operation.  
The hazards involved in the use of explosives prove the necessity of reliable protection 
for all personnel involved in explosive operations. In March 2014, an accidental detonation 
occurred inside a gas gun used by the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) for 
avalanche control. Even though the investigation could not determine if it was due to a failure of 
the round, the gun, or human error, CDOT immediately implemented protective measures for its 
employees. Advanced Explosives Processing Research Group (AXPRO) at Colorado School of 
Mines was selected for the design and testing of a personnel blast shield to mitigate the hazards 
associated with these operations. CDOT currently owns more than fifteen blast shields that are 
used by their personnel in every activity involving explosives materials. 
This document will review the hazards associated with the detonations of bare and cased 
explosives. It will provide guidelines for determining the barrier requirements and safety 
distances through theoretical, analytical and numerical calculations. A full-scale blast shield 
prototype will then be designed and tested against blast and fragmentation loadings at the 
Explosives Research Laboratory (ERL) by AXPRO. To conclude this document, as in any 
operation involving energetic materials, various methodologies for the calculation of the safety 
distances for non-essential personnel will be presented. The following flowchart shows the 
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Figure 1.1 Shield design and analysis flowchart 
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CHAPTER 2 EXPLOSIVE SHOCKS IN AIR 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the basic theory and concepts in the field of 
blast waves that were applied in this work. Blast wave formation and parameters are reviewed, as 
well as the scaling principles to different yields and atmospheres. For a more in-depth 
description of the phenomena presented in this chapter, I would personally recommend referring 
to Needham (2010) and Kinney and Graham (1985) which were very useful during the 
completion of these studies.  
An explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy, which depends on the rate at 
which the energy is released (Lees 2005). There are several types of energy that may create an 
explosion. The three basic types are: physical energy, chemical energy, and nuclear energy.  
Examples of a violent release of physical energy are the sudden rupture of a high-
pressure vessel or the sudden electrostatic discharge associated with lightening. Chemical energy 
is derived from a chemical reaction and it is the type of energy associated with condensed phase 
explosives. The effects of this type of energetic materials will be the focus of this work. Nuclear 
energy is out of the scope of this work and it will not be considered here. However, in terms of 
blast waves and their effects on humans, similar physiological damage may be expected. 
A distinction must be also made between two kinds of explosions: deflagration and 
detonation. In a deflagration, a low explosive or flammable mixture burns at a rate below the 
speed of sound in the material. A detonation, on the other hand, is significantly different. In a 
detonation the detonation front propagates through the unburned material at a rate higher than 
the speed of sound of the material. Such a reaction generates a shock wave that will propagate to 
the surrounding medium. Detonation can occur in liquid and solid explosives, as well as in some 
explosive gas mixtures. In the present context it is chemical explosions, and in particular those 
resulting from the detonation of high explosives, which are of primary interest. 
 
2.1 Formation of Blast Waves 
 
This document will deal with the propagation and effect of the shock waves generated by 
the detonation of high explosives assuming atmospheric air as the surrounding medium. Small 
perturbations of a gas produce signals in the form of sound waves that propagate away from the 
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source at the speed of sound in the gas. When the energy is deposited more rapidly in the gas, 
compressive heating increases the sound speed in the local gas and energy is transmitted at the 
local speed of sound, which may now be greater than in the unperturbed air (Needham 2010). If 
the dissipation of the energy within the compressive wave does not reduce the sound speed of the 
front of the wave to the unperturbed air, the energy accumulates at the front and a shock wave is 
originated. From this, a blast wave is then defined as a shock wave that decays immediately after 
the peak is reached (Needham 2010). An explosion in air may cause widespread damage from 
the blast wave that it creates.  Figure 2.1 represents the typical overpressure versus time profile 
for a blast wave at a certain distance from the source. It must be mentioned that a similar profile 




Figure 2.1 Typical blast wave profile at a certain distance from the source 
 
The profile shown in Figure 2.1 consists of an abrupt pressure discontinuity followed by 
positive and negative pressure phases. The formation of a negative phase is due to inertial effects 
where no more energy can reach the shock front from the source region. These effects ultimately 
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produce an overexpansion and a consequent rarefaction at the explosion center (Kinney et al. 
1985). The negative phase may also contain secondary and even tertiary shocks generated by the 
source. These shocks will be trapped in the negative phase because the sound speed is below 
ambient, thus the negative velocity and therefore momentum of the gas into which it is traveling 
must be overcome (Needham 2010). As the blast wave travels outward, the peak in the blast 
parameter (Ps in Figure 2.1) decreases and the positive duration of the blast wave (td) increases.  
At the end, the blast wave decays to very low overpressure and the signal takes on some 
characteristics of a sound wave. The peak positive and negative values of the overpressure and 
time duration approach the same value while the material velocity approaches zero (Needham 
2010).  
 
2.2 Blast Wave Parameters 
 
The shock front of a blast wave is a determining factor in its behavior (Kinney et al. 1895)
Depending on the explosive charge geometry, different expanding shock wave shapes may be 
expected (i.e. planar, spherical, cylindrical, etc.). The assumption at this point is that the object 
and burst are at a certain distance where the shock radius is several times larger than the object 
height. This assumption allows approximation of the shock as a planar shock front, which can be 
treated as a discontinuity (Needham 2010). 
The properties that describe the shock front are the shock pressure, density, material 
velocity, and temperature. Based on the conservation of mass, momentum, and energy across the 
shock front, the Rankine-Hugoniot relations provide a set of equations to calculate any blast 
wave parameter by simply knowing the value of one of them and the conditions of the air where 
the shock is expanding. 
For the purpose of these studies, the concern is with shock fronts in air that it will be 
considered an ideal gas. Even though the assumption of air as n ideal gas has proved to be a 
very good approximation (see Needham 2010 and Kinney et al. 1985), it is important to 
understand the limitations of this assumption. For practical purposes, assuming the air is an ideal 
gas gives a constant value for the ratio of specific heat (γ) of 1.4. When the air is heated to a 
point that molecular disassociation of the gas occurs, the value of γ begins to decrease. Two 
different values have been found in the literature. Kinney et al. (1985) report that the assumption 
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of air as ideal gas is valid for overpressures of no more than ten bars. On the other hand, 
Needham provides the same statement for overpressures of up to twenty bars and affirms that a 
gamma of 1.4 may be used with about 99% accuracy. Although significantly lower overpressures 
are expected for the charges and ranges studied through this document, the reader must be aware 
of the limitations of the ideal gas assumption when higher overpressure values are reached. 
One of the main descriptors of the shock front is the blast parameter overpressure 
mentioned above. This parameter is defined as the pressure at the shock front minus the ambient 
pressure, and it can be measured using direct methods such as piezoelectric sensors placed at 
specific ranges (see Chapter 5). However, when dealing with the effects of blast waves on 
humans and structures, two additional pressures play a major role: the dynamic pressure and the 
reflected pressure.  
The dynamic pressure corresponds to the force per unit applied by the motion of the gas 
and it is applied in the direction of such motion. The dynamic pressure is defined as half the 
density times the square of the fluid velocity, but using the Rankine-Hugoniot relations it can be 
reduced to the following expression: 
 
� = ��� + � − �                                                         .  
 
Where Ps represents blast overpressure, γ is the ratio of specific heat (1.4 for ideal gas), and Patm 
is the ambient pressure. Typically, at a sufficient distance from the burst, the dynamic pressure is 
responsible for loading a surface with a drag pressure that will have lower intensity than the peak 
overpressure but higher duration (Glasstone et al. 1977). 
The reflected pressure is the pressure caused by the reflection of a shock wave from a 
non-responding surface. The value of the reflected pressure is dependent on the angle of 
incidence of the shock. When a shock strikes perpendicular to the surface, the reflected 
overpressure can be expressed as: 
 � = � + � + �                                                           .  
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Where Ps represents blast overpressure, γ is the ratio of specific heat (1.4 for ideal gas), and q is 
the dynamic pressure. It must be noted that the reflected pressure for the case of normal 
incidence can be as high as eight times the incident overpressure. 
 Finally, time duration of the blast wave plays a major role in studying the effects of 
explosives shocks on humans and structures. The time duration of a blast wave impacts its ability 
to cause damage. This is because the damage inflicted depends in part on how long the damaging 
forces are applied. In this context, the positive phase is the factor being analyzed. The positive 
duration of a blast wave is the time between the passing of the shock and the end of the positive 
pressure phase as marked by a zero overpressure. The negative phase of the explosive wave is 
usually not taken into account for design purposes as it has been verified that the main human 
and structural damage is connected to the positive phase (Karlos et al. 2013).  
 Impulse is also an important aspect of the damage-causing ability of the blast, and may 
become a limiting factor in some situations. Impulse has the dimensions of a force-time product, 
and for a blast wave it represents the area under the curve in the pressure-time history. For this 
reason, blast wave impulses depend not only on the peak overpressure and the duration of the 
wave, but also on the rate of decay of the overpressure (Kinney et al. 1985). However, for some 
design purposes, a conservative approximation of the positive overpressure-time history is 
assuming a triangular pulse. This overpressure-time curve with a null waveform parameter 
provides overestimated impulse values depending on the distance from the center of the 
explosion. The error associated with this estimation decreases with the range as the overpressure-
time curve approaches a triangular pulse. 
 
2.3 Scaling Principles 
 
Blast waves generated from high explosives depend both on the explosive energy 
released and on the nature of the medium where the blast propagated. These characteristics are 
defined for any particular explosion, but it is often useful to be able to scale the results from one 
scenario to a similar one that has a different yield or different medium conditions. This section 
will briefly introduce several scaling laws widely applied in the field of shock and blast. These 
laws are basically reduced to yield scaling and atmospheric scaling (Needham 2010). 
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2.3.1 Yield Scaling 
 
The Hopkinson-Cranz scaling law, or cube-root scaling law, is based on the principles of 
geometric similarity. When applying this law to explosive shocks in air, two explosions of the 
same nature in identical atmospheres are expected to generate identical blast waves at distances 
that are proportional to the cube root of their yields. In other words, to produce a blast at twice  
given distance requires eight times the explosive yield (Kinney et al. 1985). 
The yield or total energy released by the detonation of a condensed high explosive is 
called the detonation energy, and it is obtained by multiplying the energy per unit mass for that 
particular explosive material, times the mass of the charge: 
 � =                                                            .  
 
Where Y represents the yield or total energy released, ρe is the explosive density, Edet is the 
detonation energy, and Rc is the charge radius. Since the detonation pressure is constant 
throughout the detonation process inside the charge, at one charge radius the pressure is the 
detonation pressure independently of the charge size. For this reason, the pressure at a distance 
measured in charge radii has the same value and is thus independent of the charge size (Needham 
2010). Figure 2.2 provides a graphic explanation of this concept where P represents a blast 
parameter. 
 
Figure 2.2 Geometrical similarity in yield scaling 
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 In equation (2.3), the detonation energy Edet and the explosive density ρe are independent 
of the charge size. Thus, the ratio of the yield of two charges can be written as follows: 
 �� = ( )                                                                  .  
 
Therefore, the radius at which a given blast wave parameter occurs can be expressed in 
terms of the radius at which that same parameter occurs for the same charge of different size 
multiplied by the cube root of the ratio of yields (Needham 2010). Additionally, since the yield 
represents the detonation energy times the mass of explosive, the same scaling expression can be 
determined for mass of explosives and distance: 
 
� = � √3                                                          .  
 
Where P represents a blast parameter, Ri is the distance from the center of the explosion, and Wi 
is the mass of explosive for each charge. This relationship holds very precisely for spherical 
charges of the same explosive, but is still useful for comparing one explosive to another in an 
approximate manner (Needham 2010). For the purpose of these studies, the yield scaling allows 
the calculation of operational distances for mobile barriers with different explosive charges based 
on the results obtained for one scenario. It must be also noted that the previous analysis is only 
valid for spherical expanding shocks. Although, cylindrical blast waves do not initially follow 
the cube root law, the expanding shock will end up adopting a spherical shape due to geometric 
divergence (Esparza 1992). A more detailed analysis regarding charge geometry influence will 
be introduced in Chapter 6.   
Kinney and Graham (1985) also incorporated the conservation of momentum to this 
dimensional analysis by introducing the properties of the medium in terms of atmospheric 
density. In their analysis, it is the energy release per unit mass of surrounding medium that 
becomes a limiting factor. For the purpose of these studies, the modified Sachs´ scaling laws 
described in the following section will be used for introducing the properties of the medium. 
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2.3.2 Atmospheric Scaling 
 
The detonation of an explosive charge at different atmospheric conditions implies 
important changes from air blasts generated from charges detonated at sea level. The relation 
between overpressure, distance, and time that describe the propagation of a blast wave in air 
depend upon the ambient atmospheric conditions, and these vary with altitude. In reviewing the 
effects of elevation in blast phenomena, the pressure and sound speed at the point of interest 
must be known (Needham 2010).  
For an air burst, the peak overpressure at a given distance from the explosion will depend 
on the ambient atmospheric pressure that varies with the burst altitude. With increasing altitude 
of both the measurement and burst points, the overpressure at a given distance from the 
explosion will generally decrease. Correspondingly, an increase can usually be expected in both 
the arrival time of the shock front and in the duration of the positive phase of the blast wave. 
According to Glasstone et al. (1977), for elevations of less than 5,000 feet or so above sea level 
changes are small, but since many operations involving high explosives are executed at higher 
elevations, such as avalanche control missions, it may be necessary to make the corrections. 
A somewhat more complex case is when the burst and the point of interest are at very 
different elevations. Since the blast wave is influenced by changes in air temperature and 
pressure in the atmosphere through which it travels, some variations in the pressure-distance 
relationship might be expected. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the atmosphere on a 
particular day would be necessary in order to make precise calculations (Glasstone et al. 1977). 
For the purpose of this research and because of the explosives yields used, this effect may be 
ignored.  
Sachs scaling laws can be used to predict variations in blast wave properties in ambient 
conditions other than sea level (DOE/TIC-11268). To apply the required correction factors, the 
ambient atmospheric pressure and sound velocity must be known. Since sound velocity is a 
function of temperature, it is sufficient to know ambient pressure and temperature.  
The correction factors take into account the fact that the absolute temperature Tatm and 
ambient pressure Patm at a certain altitude are not the same as absolute temperature T0 and 
ambient pressure P0 at sea level. For the overpressure, the corrected value is: 
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� = � ��                                                                 .  
 
Where Ps is the overpressure at altitude, and P1 is that at sea level. On the other hand, the time 
arrival and positive phase duration of the blast overpressure scale is as follows: 
 
� = � ( �� ) ( )                                                     .  
 
Where t is the time arrival or duration of the positive overpressure at that altitude, and t1 is that at 
sea level. The factor (T0/Tatm)
1/2 appears in the expression because the speed of sound is 
proportional to the square root of the absolute temperature. 
As mentioned previously, these equations are applicable when the target and the burst 
point are at roughly the same altitude. If the altitude difference is less than a few thousand feet, 
the temperature and pressure at a mean altitude may be used (Glasstone et al. 1977). 
In order to facilitate calculations based on the equations in the preceding paragraph. The 
following factors must be defined: 
 = ��                                                                         .  
= (�� ) ( )                                                                 .  
 
The reference values P0 and T0 are for a standard sea-level atmosphere. The atmospheric 
pressure P0 is 14.7 pounds per square inch and the temperature T0 is 59˚F or 288˚ Kelvin. Table 
2.1 represents values of ambient temperature, ambient pressure, and the calculated correction 
factors for overpressure and time for different elevations. The values adopted for ambient 
pressure and temperature are those provided by the “U.S. Standard Atmosphere, 1976”. 
However, it must be noted that the actual pressure and sonic velocity will vary around the 
standard accepted values according to local meteorological activity at the time of the explosion 
(Glasstone et al. 1977). 
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Table 2.1 Altitude correction factors for blast overpressure and duration 
Elevation (ft) Temperature (K) Pressure (psi) Sp St 
Under 5,000 288 14.70 1 1 
6,000 276 11.77 0.80 1.10 
8,000 273 10.92 0.74 1.13 
10,000 268 10.11 0.69 1.17 
12,000 265 9.35 0.64 1.21 
14,000 260 8.64 0.59 1.25 
 
According to Table 2.1, blast waves at a certain altitudes will have longer durations yet a 
significant decrease in the peak blast overpressures may be observed. For example, the 
detonation of one pound of TNT produces an incident overpressure of approximately 15.4 psi at 
6.4 feet from the center of the explosion at sea level. The same charge at 6,500 feet of elevai n
would generate 12 psi instead of 15.4 psi at that same range (Needham 2010).  
The expected accuracy of the modified Sachs scaling laws is about 20% for general 
applications of blast waves propagating through a real atmosphere (Needham 2010). It must also 
be mentioned that the detonation pressure for a solid explosive is independent of the altitude at 
which it is detonated. For this reason, according to Needham (2010), the ambient atmospheric 
pressure has very little effect on the peak pressure or the velocity of the expanding detonation 
products until the products have expanded at least ten charge radii. For practical purposes, the 









CHAPTER 3 EXPLOSION INJURY TO HUMANS 
 
The purpose of designing a blast shield is to protect personnel from the effects that 
accompany the detonation of a bare or cased explosive charge. The first factor is to analyze the 
potential hazards to humans from air blast and fragmentation in order to define the level of saf ty 
required. This chapter will review the three main types of blast damage associated with these 
explosions.  
Each situation has its own unique topographical conditions that may dissipate the energy 
of the blast wave or reflect and amplify its effect on an individual. For our calculations, the 
human body receiver is assumed to be standing in the free field on flat and level ground when 
contacted by the blast wave. Excluding certain reflected wave situations, this is the most 
hazardous body exposure condition (DOE/TIC-11268).  
Blast damage effects can be divided into four main categories: primary blast effects, 
secondary blast effects, tertiary blast effects, and quaternary blast effects. Quaternary dam ge 
and other miscellaneous injury types such as blast-induced neurotrauma (BINT) will not be 
covered in this text. Ear damage due to air blast exposure will be evaluated separately as the ear 
is not the most critical, but the most sensitive organ to blast overpressures. 
 
3.1 Primary Blast Damage 
 
Primary blast effects are associated with changes in environmental pressure due to the 
presence of an air blast. Humans are sensitive to the incident wave, reflected and dynamic 
overpressures, the rate of rise to peak overpressure after the arrival of the blast wave, the 
duration of such blast wave, and the specific impulse of the blast wave (DOE/TIC-11268). Tests 
have indicated that the air-containing tissues of the lungs can be considered as the critical target 
organ in blast overpressure injuries. The release of air bubbles from disrupted alveoli of the lungs 
into the vascular system likely accounts for most deaths (TM 5-1300). Typically, the lower the 
specific lung volume (lung volume/body mass), the more vulnerable the body is to shock. Figure 
3.1 shows the fatality curves predicted for a 70 kg man which is applicable in ast situations 
where the thorax is near a surface against which a shocked blast wave reflects at normal 
incidence (White et al. 1971). These curves represent percent survivability for peak pressure-
positive durations. Higher pressure-positive duration combinations allow fewer survivors. 
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Figure 3.1 Fatality curves predicted for 70 Kg man applicable to blast situations where the thorax 




 Fatality curves for a near reflective surface are presented as a conservative criterion since 
each situation has its own unique conditions that may amplify the energy of the blast wave. 
Different authors have shown similar results referring primary blast injures through history. 
Since there are some differences, additional survival/fatality curves are included in Appendix A 
for comparison purposes (Figures A.1 to A.4). Figure A.1 and A.2 shows fatality curves for 
different body positions relative to the incident blast wave. Figure A.3 shows the set of curves 
presented in Cooper (1996) for an analogous blast situation as the one presented in Figure 3.1. 
Figure A.4 represents similar results with scaled axes for overpressure and impulse. Presenting a 
scaled axis is advantageous becasue these conditions apply at altitudes with different 
atmospheric pressures and different masses of human bodies. Scaled overpressure is calculated 
using the atmospheric pressure for a certain altitude. Scaled impulse is dependent on the 
atmospheric pressure and the mass of the human body (DOE/TIC-11268). It should be noted that 
the smallest bodies are the most susceptible to injury. 
 Various threshold values for lung damage have been found from different sources 
ranging from 8 to 15 psi for fast-rising, long duration pulses. Special consideration is taken in the 
presence of a reflective surface near the thorax of the body. For design purposes, the threshold 
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value adopted for lung damage will be the one presented in Figure 3.1 in order to prevent 
possible unforeseen shock reflection situations.  
 
3.1.1 Ear Damage Due to Air Blast Exposure 
 
The ear is a sensitive organ that responds to a band of frequencies ranging from 20 Hz to 
20,000 Hz. Not being able to respond to pulses having periods less than 0.3 milliseconds, it 
attempts to do so by making a single large excursion. It is this motion that can cause injury to the 
ear (DOE/TIC-11268). 
As with other air-filled organs, limits for eardrum rupture and temporary threshold shift 
(TTS) are dependent on peak incident overpressure and duration. TTS usually abates within 48 
hours but might last longer. Symptoms of TTS may include a temporary muffling of sound after 
hazardous exposure, a sensation of fullness in the ear(s), tinnitus, and increased feelings of stress 
or fatigue (US Army DA PAM 40-501). Rapid rise of overpressure tends to increase the 
probability of rupture. Table 3.1 shows the data provided by Lees (1996) relating the probability 
of eardrum rupture for different values of peak overpressure. 
 
Table 3.1 Probability of eardrum rupture for different peak overpressures (Ref.: Lees 1996) 




1 (threshold) 2.4 16.5 
10 2.8 19.3 
50 6.3 43.5 
90 12.2 84.0 
 
 
Lees (1996) also presents data for eardrum rupture from other authors (Glasstone (1962) 
and White (1968)) that report a threshold value of 5 psi for blast waves arriving at normal angle 
of incidence. The same value of 5 psi has been found in “DOE/TIC-11268” and in the “ME 
Design Safety Standards Manual 1994”. Additionally, Figure 3.2 presented by Cooper (1996) 
reports the response of ears to a single pressure pulse. 
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Figure 3.2 Response of ears to a single pressure pulse (Ref.: Cooper 1996) 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the 1% and 50% probabilities of adverse ear effects in relation to 
pressure and pulse duration for three different levels of ear injury. Level 1 represents minor 
healable ear damage, level 2 is permanent hearing loss, and level 3 includes severe rupture of the 
membrane along with inner ear damage (Cooper, 1996). The threshold value for 1% probability 
of Level 1 response is approximately 2.7 psi for long pulse durations. This value falls between 
the 2.4 psi and 5 psi found in other sources.  
At lower overpressures than those required to rupture eardrums, a temporary loss of 
hearing can occur. “DOE/TIC-11268” and the “ME Design Safety Standards Manual 1994” 
report a threshold value of overpressure of 0.2 psi in order to avoid any kind of temporary 
hearing loss. This temporary threshold shift (TTS) is shown in Appendix A (Figure A.5).  
For design purposes, “MIL-STD-398A” indicates that the peak incident overpressure 
must be limited to 2.3 psi in the case of accidental detonations, or to an impulse noise level of 




3.1.1.1 Hearing Protection 
A major health effect of unprotected noise exposure is permanent hearing loss. Blast 
overpressures generate hazards to the hearing of personnel and the general public. Special 
protective features used at detonation or demolition sites to eliminate or confine missiles may not 
reduce or mitigate overpressure and noise hazards.  
One form of controlling noise hazards is through the proper use of hearing protection 
devices (HPDs). Hearing protective devices are barriers that reduce the amount of noise reaching 
the sensitive inner ear. Fit, comfort, and sound reduction or “attenuation” are important 
considerations in choosing HPDs. Commonly used hearing protection devices are either earplugs 
or earmuffs (Canadian Infrastructure & Health Association 2013). However, when dealing with 
ear damage potential, pressures are often expressed as decibel noise level. The formula for 
converting pound per square inch to decibels is: 
 = + � � ( �. )                                          .  
 
Where dB represents the decibels, and P is the peak overpressure in pounds per square inch. 
According to the US Army DA PAM 385–63 (Range Safety), paragraph 15-1 (h), hearing 
protection is required for any exposure to noise greater than 140 decibels peak (dBP). This is the 
noise limit for impulse noise. Impulse noise is defined as high-level, short-duration acoustic 
energy, which lasts for less than one second. 
The 140dBP contour is the distance at which the impulse noise produced by the weapon 
or explosive is 140 decibels peak level. The US Army DA PAM 385–63 (Range Safety) provides 
with the following formula for the estimation of the 140dBP contour: 
 
� = ×                                                          .  
 
Where D140dBP is the distance in meters from the center of the explosion, and W is the weight of 
explosive in Kilograms. A less restrictive value for the calculation of the 140dBP contour was 
also found in the “UN International Ammunition Technical Guideline (2013)”, Section 9.4, 
Table 27. The equation substitutes the factor 300 in equation (3.1) for 215. Following the most 
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conservative criteria, equation (3.1) is adopted as reference for the calculation of the 140dBP 
contour. Table 3.2 contains the distances for various weights of explosives: 
 
Table 3.2 Hearing protection distances (Ref.: US Army DA PAM 385–63, table 15-3) 
Weight of Explosives Distance to 140dBP Contour 
Kg lb m 
0.10 0.25 145 
0.23 0.50 183 
0.45 1.00 230 
0.91 2.00 290 
2.27 5.00 394 
4.45 10.00 497 
9.10 20.00 626 
22.70 50.00 849 
45.00 100.00 1,070 
91.00 200.00 1,348 
 
 
The US Army DA PAM 385–63, paragraph 15-12 (a) determines the minimum safety 
standoff distance for personnel conducting explosive entry techniques at the range at which the 
possibility of eardrum damage is less than 1 percent. This standoff distance is related to blast 
pressure and does not reflect fragmentation damage. The same paragraph states that 
fragmentation standoff will equal the blast standoff when a protective barrier is provided 
between the explosive and the personnel if  the barrier is able to absorb all the fragmentation. For 
barrier design, MIL-STD-398A set this pressure limit to 2.3 psi for accidental detonations. 
For the purpose of this work and in order to establish the hearing protection required, a 
maximum permissible overpressure peak of 2 psi inside the blast shield when conducting 
explosives operations will be used. From equation (3.1), a 2 psi peak overpressure corresponds to 
176.77dBP hence personnel must wear hearing protection while sheltered behind the shield. 
The next step will be to identify the noise level to which an individual may be exposed to 
throughout an entire working day and determine the class or grade of hearing protection needed.
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Impulse levels can be so high that single hearing protection does not adequately protect hearing 
(US Army DA PAM 385–63). Double hearing protection may then be required in some cases. 
Double hearing protection consists of wearing earplugs in combination with noise muffs or noise 
attenuating helmets. However, personnel wearing HPDs that provide too much attenuation may 
feel isolated from their surroundings. Sounds may be muffled, and speech or warning sounds 
may be unrecognizable. Overprotection can lead personnel to resist wearing HPDs. For this 
reason, equipment should be chosen to provide sufficient, but not excessive, attenuation. 
 For the maximum peak level considered of 176.77dBP (2psi), single or double protection 
is required depending on the number of exposures per day and the B-duration. The B-duration is 
defined as the time that it takes noise to decay from the highest peak level to either 20 dB or 10 
percent of the highest peak level. B-durations range from under 10 to more than 300 milli seconds 
(US Army DA PAM 40-501). Considering expected B-durations ranging from 10 to 100 
milliseconds, the maximum permissible number of exposures per day will be five (5) for single 
hearing protection (either plugs or muffs) and a hundred (100) for double hearing protection 
(MIL-STD-1474D, Table 4-I). Figure A.6 in Appendix A represents peak sound pressure levels 
and B-duration limits for impulse noise. This graph can be used for the determination of the 
noise limit category (W, X, Y, Z). For additional information on the adequate hearing protection, 
please refer to MIL-STD-1474D, Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard, Noise Limits, 
February 1997. Table 3.3 summarizes the values presented in this section relating noise limit 
exposures and required hearing protection for personnel conducting explosives operations. 
 
 Table 3.3 Summary noise limit and hearing protection required for personnel inside the shield 
Parameter Value 
Shielded Noise Level Limit (dBP) 176.77  
B-Duration (msec) 10-100 
Maximum Number of Exposures per Day1  
           Single Hearing Protection 5 
           Double Hearing Protection 100 
1A single exposure consists of either a single impulse for non-repetitive systems or a 




3.2 Secondary Blast Damage 
 
Secondary injuries are caused by fragments and other objects propelled by the explosion. 
Injuries to personnel due to fragment impact can be divided into two categories, primary 
fragment and secondary fragment injuries. Primary fragments are normally small, high-speed 
fragments that cause injury by penetration and perforation of vital areas of the body. Secondary 
fragments are normally larger and have less velocity upon impact and can cause non-penetrating 
blunt trauma (DOE/TIC-11268). 
Figure 3.3 contains personnel fragment impact damage criteria for different body parts as 
presented by Ahlers (1969). The serious injury threshold curves in Figure 3.3 specify the debris 
velocity and weight combinations below which no serious injuries are expected to occur. 
 
 





In this figure no specific shape is assumed except that the fragments cannot be missiles or 
long rod penetrators. If fragment mass and velocity combinations fall near or above the lines, 
personnel protection is required. If fragment mass and velocity combinations fall below the lines, 
the fragment is considered fairly safe. 
Possible fragment weights and velocities will be theoretically estimated in section 4.2 for 
a heavy and light cased explosives charge. Next, an estimation of the fragment hazard range will 
be developed considering several empirical formulations in chapter 7.  
 
3.3 Tertiary Blast Damage 
 
Another blast effect is bodily translation. Tertiary blast damage involves whole-body 
displacement and subsequent decelerating impacts due to the interaction of the human body with 
blast overpressures and impulses. The extent of injuries caused by decelerating impacts is more 
significant. Although it depends on different factors such as type of surface impacted or the area 
of the body involved, it is evaluated using the velocity change at impact. Assuming the worst-
case scenario, only impacts against a hard surface that depend only on impact velocity will be 
considered. Due to the delicate nature of the human head, translation damage criteria are based 
on skull fracture and concussion (DOE/TIC-11268).  
Figure 3.4 contains the pressure-scaled impulse combination required to produce the 
velocities for various expected percentages of skull fracture at sea level. Changes in these curves 
for other altitudes are negligible.  
According to Figure 3.4, impact velocities fewer than 10 feet per second (11 km/h) are 
considered mostly safe. The set of curves presented are scaled to the mass of the body since 
pressure-impulse combinations produce different translations depending on the mass of the 
subject. A few assumptions are made when using the graph represented in Figure 3.4. First, the 
translation damage is assumed to occur during decelerating impact. Second, the impact occurs 




Figure 3.4 Pressure – Impulse skull fracture curves (DOE/TIC-11268) 
 
Since the hazards to humans from the detonation of high explosives have been analyzed 
and the threshold values defined, the next step will consist of the prediction of the possible loads 
generated by the explosive source for the final barrier design.  
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CHAPTER 4 BARRIER DESIGN PARAMETERS 
 
It is critical in the design of a personnel blast shield or any other barrier to consider all the 
possible loads that it may be subjected to. This chapter will evaluate the blast and fragmentation 
loading by using theoretical and empirical formulations. Then, a personnel blast shield will be 
designed in order to withstand such loads. Operational distances will be established depending 
on the expected loads and required safety factor. 
 Calculations for shields to protect personnel and equipment from blast and fragments are 
based on the total energy in the system to be shielded. That energy can be released as the 
overpressure in a blast wave and/or as the kinetic energy and momentum of a fragment (ME 
Design Safety Standards Manual 1994). The blast or fragment parameters of importance can be 
calculated using the following methodology: 
 
 Determine energy in system. The chemical energy stored in an explosive charge is 
directly proportional to the mass and type of charge. 
 Evaluate blast and projectile hazards. Determine blast overpressure and projectile 
velocity, mass, and size. 
 Compare hazards with threshold values. According to DOD 6055-9-STD, when 
required, personnel protection must limit incident blast overpressure to 2.3 psi (15.9 
KPa), fragments to energies of less than 58 ft-lb (79 joules), and thermal fluxes to 0.3 
calories per square centimeter per second (12.56 kilowatts per square meter). 
 Design needed protection. Incorporate appropriate safety factors, use the perforation 
thickness and penetration depths predicted for shield design. 
 
The loads will be divided into blast loading and fragmentation loading. Each will be dealt 
with separately. Thermal loading will not be considered during this work as it is expected to be 
the least restrictive. The blast loading in our analysis will be the one resulting from the 
detonation of a 2.2lb (1 Kg) high explosive (HE) charge. Two common commercial and military 
explosives will be used: Pentolite and Composition B.  
The fragmentation loading will be evaluated for two different weights and types of casing 
using a set of accepted empirical equations. Then, the penetration depth will be predicted using 
the formulations provided by ConWep and specified in the Army Technical Manual TM-5-855-
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1, “Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects”. ConWep 
can perform a variety of conventional weapons effects calculations, including an assortment of 
air blast routines, fragment and projectile penetrations, cratering, and ground shock (Hyde 
1988). Finally, adequate safety factors will be applied to determine the barrier thickness 
requirements and minimum standoff distances for the personnel blast shield. The first step is to 
determine the blast loading imparted by the blast wave generated from the condensed phase high 
explosives. 
 
4.1 Blast Loading Evaluation  
 
When a shock impinges at head-on incidence onto an unyielding surface, the movement 
of the particles is terminated abruptly (Kinney et al. 1985). Then, the surface experiences an 
acting reflected pressure much higher than the incident one. Clearly, this reflected pressure 
should be used for this design (Karlos 2013). 
Once the parameters of the incident blast wave have been defined, the loads on the shield 
facing the detonation can be defined using the Rankine-Hugoniot relations for reflected pressure 
in the case of normal incidence (equation (2.2)). Calculations of the incident and reflected 
overpressures are performed using ConWep for 2.2lb Pentolite and Composition B charges. 
Charles Kingery and Gerald Bulmash developed the equations currently used by ConWep to 
estimate the blast overpressure at range, and they are widely accepted as authoritative 
engineering predictions for determining free-field pressures and loads on structures. Thes  
equations can be found in Kingery and Bulmash (1984) and other open sources.  
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the incident and reflected overpressures versus range for 
2.2lb Pentolite and Composition B charges. Both plots represent hemispherical surface bursts at 
normal atmospheric conditions (1 atm and 15°C). The surface burst behavior assumes that the 
energy in the blast wave has been concentrated into a hemisphere rather than being dispersed in 
all directions. Therefore, the effect of an explosion at an unyielding surface acts to double the 
effective explosion yield (Kinney et al. 1985).  However, if the detonation takes place at a real 
surface, the yield is reduced by as much as 20% to account for the energy partitioned into 
cratering and ground shock (Needham 2010). When the incident shock strikes the shield, the 
front face will experience the reflected pressure at that range. As the shock, which is reflected 
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from the structure, moves away from the front surface, the load is reduced to the stagnation 
pressure. The stagnation pressure is the sum of the overpressure and the dynamic pressure 
(Needham 2010). As the incident blast wave decays, the stagnation overpressure also decays. 
Because the shield is finite, rarefaction waves are generated at each edge of the shield. The 
rarefaction waves move at sound speed from the edges toward the center of the face of the shield, 
causing further decay of the stagnation overpressure. On the other hand, the impulse is expected 
to reach a maximum value at the ground level center of the shield face. In the regions where the 
rarefaction wave has not yet arrived, the pressure load is the stagnation pressure of the incident 
blast wave (Needham 2010).  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Incident and reflected overpressure versus Range for 2.2 lb Pentolite hemispherical 




Figure 4.2 Incident and reflected overpressure versus Range for 2.2 lb Composition B 
hemispherical surface burst (ConWep) 
 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the overpressure-range plots for a hemispherical 
expanding shock in air. The blast loads expected in the structure will decrease, as the barrier is 
placed further away from the center of the explosion.  
The overpressure-range plot can also be affected by a detonation of the charge at a certain 
distance from the ground rather than resting on it. As it was presented for the surface burst case, 
when the incident blast wave from an explosion in air strikes a denser medium such as the Earth 
‘s surface, it is reflected. If this explosion takes places at a certain distance above the ground or 
another reflective surface, the shock wave will be reflected off of the ground to form a second 
shock wave traveling behind the first.  However, the reflected wave always travels through air 
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that has been heated and compressed by the passage of the incident wave. As a result, the 
reflected wave front moves faster than the incident wave, and under certain conditions, 
eventually overtakes it so that the two wave fronts merge to produce a single front. This process 
of wave interaction is called “Mach” reflection and the single shock front is known as Mach 
stem. The point at which the incident wave, reflected wave, and Mach front meet is referred to as 
the “triple point” (Glasstone et al. 1977). 
 
Figure 4.3 Mach stem formation (Ref.: Glasstone et al. 1977) 
 
As the reflected wave continues to overtake the incident wave, the triple point rises and 
the height of the Mach stem increases. Any object located either at or above the ground, within 
the Mach region and below the triple point path, will experience a single shock several times 
higher than the peak overpressure of the original shock. In the end, the Mach stem grows so 
much that it disappears and the expanding shock wave adopts a hemispherical shape. 
When shields are designed to resist blast, the tie downs must be able to withstand the 
force arising from the overpressure applied over the entire shield surface. If a plate is used for the 
shield, it must be sufficiently thick that the proposed support structure will limit its deformation 
under pressure loading (ME Design Safety Standards Manual 1994).  
The blast load on the barrier is a factor to take into consideration. However, most 
restrictive values are expected to be imposed by the physiological human response behind or 
inside the shield. When a barrier is facing a blast wave, the high pressure on the front of the 
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structure causes the gas to be accelerated parallel to the reflecting surface. This flow partially
diverts the flow away from the sides and top of the structure, thus reducing, at least temporarily, 
the loads on these surfaces. The outward flow induces the development of vortices on the edges 
of the structure. These vortices are relatively stable, do not dissipate rapidly, and cause low 
overpressure regions on the sides and top of the structure (Needham 2010). But it is the pressure 
built-up in the rear of the shield that is of the most interest.  For simple parallelepiped 
geometries, Kinney and Graham (1985) states that pressure in the rear face begins to increase 
and approaches the instantaneous value of the difference between the stagnation and dynamic 
pressures. The authors also state that the time required for pressure build-up is approximately 
three times the time it takes for a compression wave to travel across the rear face. Figure 4.3 
provides a visual comparison between the overpressure expected in the rear face versus the 
incident blast wave. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Estimated average load on the rear face of a parallelepiped versus time (black). The 
red curve represents the incident overpressure of the blast wave (Ref.: Kinney et al. 1985) 
 
 Figure 4.3 represents an estimation of the rear loads for a parallelepiped. When 
considering a more complex geometry, differences in the peak pressure values and time may be 
expected. The side-on loads and rear pressure attenuation for the blast shield design will be 
covered in more detail in chapter 6. 
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4.2 Fragmentation Loading Evaluation  
 
Significant damage is caused by fragments that are generated during the explosion of 
cased high explosives. Fragments from equipment or machinery in contact with or near to the 
detonation of an explosive charge can be accelerated to very high velocities and pose a threat to 
nearby personnel and equipment (DOE/TIC-11268). 
In this section, the generation of primary fragments from two types and weights of ca ing 
will be discussed. A primary fragment is a fragment from a casing or container of an explosive 
source or a fragment from an object in contact with an explosive. If the source is a true high 
explosive, the container or casing usually ruptures into many small primary fragments that can 
be projected at velocities up to several thousand feet per second by the explosion. These primary 
fragments, although irregular, are usually “chunky” geometry (DOE/TIC-11268).  
The pertinent fragment parameters of velocity, mass, and size are required for shield 
design. Since the results obtained are expected to be similar for explosives in th  same range of 
detonation velocities, the calculations in this section are only presented for Composition B. The 
same procedures would apply for a cased Pentolite charge.  
 
 
4.2.1. Fragment Initial Velocity 
 
The most common technique for calculating the initial velocity of fragments in contact 
with an explosive charge is the Gurney Method. The Gurney Equations are a set of formulas 
used in explosives engineering to predict how fast an explosive will accelerate a surrounding 
layer of metal or other material when the explosive detonates. This determines how fast primary 
fragments are released on detonation (DOE/TIC-11268). These equations assume that the 
conversion from chemical energy to “Gurney Energy” is accomplished with no losses, taking 
advantage of the fact that the material strength can be ignored (Needham 2010). The Gurney 
equation for cylindrical charges is as follows: 
 
√ = ( + )−                                                              .  
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Where, V0 is the initial fragment velocity in meters per second, √2E is the Gurney constant for a 
given explosive in meters per second, M is the mass of the accelerated shell in kilograms, and C 
is the explosive charge mass in kilograms. From equation (4.1), it can be seen that Gurney´s 
basic premise is that the fragment mean velocity is a function of the type of explosive and the 
charge to mass ratio (Needham 2010).  
 Two different types of casing are considered for comparison of their effects in terms of 
fragmentation loading. The first is a 29.81 lb steel casing referred as “heavy casing”, and the 
second is a 1.55 lb aluminum casing referred to as “light casing”. The criterion employed for 
casing denomination is based on one presented by Needham (2010): light cases are defined for 
casing-explosive mass ratios ranging from 0.03 to 1; and moderate to heavily cased charges for 
ratios ranging from 1 to 5 or more. The two masses and types of casing selected come from th  
studies performed on the bodies of two types of gas guns or avalaunchers for use of which the 
personnel blast shield was originally designed. Estimated cross-sectional views of the guns are 
included in Appendix C. 
Calculations using equation (4.1) are performed for a 2.2 lb cylindrical charge of 
Composition B using the two types of casing discussed above. The adopted Gurney constant for 
Composition B is 2,774 m/s (DOE/TIC-11268). Different values can be found depending the 
density of the condensed phase explosive. Cooper (1996) reports seven different values for 
Composition B ranging from 2,700 m/s to 2,770 m/s. For design purposes and to follow a 
conservative criterion, the higest value found will be adopted.  
In general, the values of √2E are for the case where the metals involved have very high 
ultimate strain. That is, the explosive gases can drive or work on the metal for a large portion of 
the gas expansion. However, when metals are brittle or have low ultimate strain, they will 
fracture at smaller expansion ratios. The detonation gases will then stream around the fragments 
and the acceleration process stops. Typically, the fragment velocities of exploding cylinders of 
brittle metals are 80% of the predicted value (Cooper 1996).  
Table 4.1 shows initial velocities for primary fragmentation obtained from the Gurney 





Table 4.1 Fragment initial velocities for heavy and light casings 
Casing Type Charge Weight of Casing M/C Initial Fragment Velocity 
Heavy Casing 2.2 lb Comp B 29.81 lb 13.55 2,430.74 ft/s 
Light Casing 2.2 lb Comp B 1.55 lb 0.70 8,295.34 ft/s 
 
According to the results presented in Table 4.1, velocities of almost 3.5 times higher are 
expected of the fragments that originated from the light casing. The applicability of the 
calculated values to the casing body of the gas guns can be argued since two major assumptions 
have been applied. First, the complex steel multi-layer body of the avalauncher type 1 (Figure
C.1) has been approximated using one single steel cylinder of equivalent mass. This 
approximation still complies with the energy balance, but it is expected that the rupture of the 
actual casing would create a significantly more complex fragmentation pattern. Secondly, the 
explosive charges contained within the body of the guns (Figure C.1 and Figure C.2) are not bare 
charges in intimate contact with the casing, but explosive rounds with a near cylindrical shape 
where the explosive material is casted within a thin plastic body. These two characteristics of the 
guns and the rounds make it quite difficult to accurately predict the real fragmentation using 
theoretical and empirical equations. However, the values estimated using these formulations are 
expected to provide conservative results based on their assumptions. Since the purpose of this 
work is to improve the safety of the personnel, overestimations in the fragmentation are 
considered acceptable.  
 
 
4.2.2 Fragment Mass Distribution 
 
Upon detonation of a cased explosive, the casing breaks up into a large number of high 
velocity fragments with varying weights and velocities. The destructive potential of these 
fragments is a function of their kinetic energy distribution. Therefore, the initial velocity and 
weight of the “worst case” fragment must be determined and utilized as a design criterion for 
personnel barriers (DOE/TIC-11268). The use of the Gurney model enabled prediction of the 
initial velocities of fragments that were generated by an explosion of a cased cylindrical charge. 
It is of great interest in relation to safety analysis, to be able to predict or at least estimate the 
32  
number and size distribution of such fragments (Cooper 1996). There are several theories about 
how the fragments are formed, but one of the most common and widely accepted for first-order 
engineering predictions is the one introduced by Nevil Francis Mott. 
The Mott equation yields estimates of the fragment mass distribution resulting from the 
high-order detonation of an evenly distributed explosive within a uniform thickness and naturally 
fragmenting cylindrical casing. Since the actual casings and rounds do not conform to these 
ideals conditions, the resulting fragment sizes and velocities are expected to have some 
variations. The other issue with using the work of Mott is finding values of the Mott constant (B) 
for a variety of metals. In this case, the value of B for aluminum could not be found so the one 
for mild steel was used. According to Needham (2010), the use of constants from other case 
materials is not supported by experimental data but can provide some guidance for fragment size 
distribution. Treating the casing and rounds as an equivalent cylindrical container, the average 
fragment weight derived from Mott equation is calculated as follows: 
 
�� = � � ( + � �)                                                    .  
 
Where, Wavg is the average fragment weight in pounds, B is the explosive constant in lb
1/2in-7/6, tc 
is the average casing thickness in inches, and di is the average inside diameter of casing in 
inches. The Mott scaling constant for Composition B is 0.0554 lb1/2in-7/6 (DOE/TIC-11268). The 
average casing thickness tc is 0.633 inches for heavy casing and 0.125 inches for light casing.  
According to the Mott equation, the average fragment weight calculated implies that 
75.7% of all primary fragments generated by the detonation have weights less than the overall 
average. For design purposes, a confidence level (CL) where 0<CL<1 can be defined as the 
probability that the weight, Wmax, is the largest weight fragment released. For CL<0.9999, the 
equation is as follows (DOE/TIC-11268): 
 
 = �� −                                                  .  
 
Where, Wmax is the maximum fragment weight in pounds, Wavg is the average fragment weight in 
pounds, and CL is the confidence level. For this case, a confidence level of 0.9 is used. Table 4.2 
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summarizes the values estimated for the average and maximum fragments from the heavy and 
light casings.  
  
Table 4.2 Estimated average and maximum fragment masses 
Casing Type Charge Weight of Casing Wavg Wmax 
Heavy Casing 2.2 lb Comp B 29.81 lb 0.1444 oz 0.3827 oz 
Light Casing 2.2 lb Comp B 1.55 lb 0.0073 oz 0.0193 oz 
 
 For design purposes, the maximum fragment mass predicted from equation (4.3) will be 
used in order to evaluate the penetration in the following sections. Thi  “worst case” fragment 
will be used for the evaluation of the shield thickness and standoff distance. Next, the fragment 
size distribution will be studied as the last parameter for the estimation of the fragmentation. 
 
4.2.3 Fragment Size Distribution 
 
In order to determine the damage potential of primary fragments, it is necessary to 
evaluate the caliber, density, and shape of the fragments, as well as the previously described 
weight and velocity. When a container fragments, a random distribution of fragment shapes 
result. From the mass of the fragment and shape of the containment vessel, one can estimate the 
size of individual fragments. This section discusses a method for performing an engineering 
estimate of a standard design fragment for use in fragment impact damage assesment. 
The influence of the fragment weight to the fragment diameter ratio is expressed in terms 
of the caliber density D of the fragment, which is defined as the total fragment weight Wmax 
divided by the fragment diameter d. In this case, a standard fragment with mild nose shape was 
used for the calculations. The standard fragment is generally considered appropriate for use in 
design since: (a) only a small number of fragments will strike the structure nose-on; and (b) only 
a small fraction of these fragments will have more severe nose shape than the standard fragment 
(DOE/TIC-11268).  
Figure 4.5 shows the shape and parameters for a standard fragment shape where n is the 
caliber radius of tangent ogive of fragment nose, N is the nose shape factor, Wf is the total 
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fragment weight, D is the caliber density for a standard fragment, and A is the cross sectional 
area. 
 
Figure 4.5 Standard Fragment Shape (Ref.: DOE/TIC-11268) 
 
According to Figure 4.5, estimations of the fragment cross sectional area A are perfomed using 
the fragment weights obtained in the previous section. The estimated fragment cross sectional 
area for heavy and light casings considering the average and maximum fragment masses is 
shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Estimated fragment area for average and maximum fragments 
Casing Type Charge Weight of Casing Aavg Amax 
Heavy Casing 2.2 lb Comp B 29.81 lb 0.1045 in2 0.2001 in2  
Light Casing 2.2 lb Comp B 1.55 lb 0.0143 in2 0.0273 in2 
 
 This section has provided estimations for the fragmentation loading generated from two 
types of casing using theoretical and empirical formulations. The intention of this section is to 
provide an engineering approach for when safety measures must be taken against these kinds of 
loads. However, several limitations are imposed while using these equations so experimental 
testing is required for the validation of the assumptions. The next step is to analyze the possible 
fragment penetration and consequently the barrier requirements for the fragmentation generated 
from both types of casing. 
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4.3 Shielding Design 
 
Once the energy in the system and possible maximum loads are estimated, the next step 
consists of determining how to protect personnel from such hazards. This section is divided into 
three main parts. First, a safety factor will be assessed according to the blast and fragmentation 
loads predicted and the type of shield intended. Second, the penetration of the primary 
fragmentation will be calculated according to the set of equations included in the microcomputer 
program ConWep. Finally, a personnel blast shield will be designed and operating distances will 
be determined according to the blast and fragmentation loadings calculated.  
 
4.3.1 Required Safety Factor 
 
Fragments striking a shield can either penetrate it or perforate it. With penetration, the 
fragment leaves a blind hole in which the fragment may or may not lodge. With perforation, the 
fragment creates a hole through the shield; the fragment may remain lodged in this hole or pass 
through it. For design purposes, penetration of the shield will not be accepted. Penetration data 
has less scatter than perforation data and, according to reference (ME Design Safety Standards 
Manual 1994), a shield thickness 1.5 times the predicted penetration depth is recommended. 
However, since several assumptions were made while estimating fragment velocities, masses, 
and sizes, a more detailed analysis is appropriate regarding the required safety factor. 
The factor of safety (or safety factor) is a term describing the capacity of a system 
beyond the expected loads or actual loads. Essentially, how much stronger the system is than it 
theoretically needs to be for an intended load. Loading may be static, impact, fatigue, wear, etc. 
In this particular case, the factor of safety will be estimated in accordance with a possible 
fragment penetration. The purpose of using a safety factor is to ensure that the design does not 
fail in the event of unexpectedly high loads or the presence of material defects. The following 
analysis was developed according to the criteria presented by David Ullman (1992), in “The 
mechanical design process”. 
 The factor of safety can be quickly predicted based on estimated variations of four 
different measures that are involved in the process: shield material, shield geometry, blast and 
fragmentation loads, and desired reliability. The better the material properties of the shield and 
nature of the loads are known, the closer the factor of safety should be to 1 (Ullman 1992). The 
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simplest way to present this technique is to associate a value greater than 1 with each of the 
measures and define the factor of safety as the product of these four values: 
 = � ×  × � × � � �                          .  
 
The criteria on how to estimate these four values are given in Appendix D and in Ullman (1992). 
These values have been developed by breaking down the rules given in textbooks and handbooks 
into the four measures and cross checking the values with those found from statistical methods 
(Ullman 1992). Table 4.4 shows the final values adopted for each contribution. 
 
Table 4.4 Estimated safety factors values  
Factor of Safety Estimation criteria 
FSmaterial = 1.1 If the materials properties are known from a handbook  
or are manufacturer’s values. 
FSloads = 1.2 If the nature of the loads is defined in an average manner,  
with overloads of 20-30%. 
FSgeometry = 1.0 If the manufacturing tolerances are tight and held well. 
 
FSreliability = 1.5 If the reliability must be high, say, greater than 99 percent. 
 
 
From the factors established in table 4.4 and by applying equation (4.4), the resultant factor of 
safety is: 
 Factor of Safety = Blast Shield ThicknessFragment Penetration = .  ≈                             .  
 
Considering this value and according to the definition of factor of safety, the shield 
thickness must be at least two times the fragment penetration depth. This factor of safety could 
be reduced to a value closer to the recommended 1.5 (ME Design Safety Standards Manual 
1994) by more accurately determining the fragmentation loads that the shield would encounter. 
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Once, the required safety factor and estimated fragmentation loadings have been defined 
(Section 4.2), the second step will be to predict the penetration and stand-off distance for the 
personnel blast shield. 
 
 4.3.2 Barrier Thickness Requirements 
 
Barrier thickness requirements are found based on fragment penetration that, for this 
work, will be the most restrictive criteria. Fragment penetration is calculated using the 
microcomputer program ConWep. ConWep predicts fragment penetration of different materials 
using the equations presented in TM 5-855-1 “Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to 
Conventional Weapons Effects”. Penetration-range curves are obtained depending on fragment 
mass, fragment initial velocity and impacted material. For design purposes, homogeneous 
hardened steel is chosen as the primary shield material.  
As it was shown in section 4.2, each type of casing generates a completely different 
fragmentation. In this section, the penetration produced in homogeneous hardened steel by a 
“worst case” fragment estimated using equations (4.1) and (4.3) for each type of casing is 
analyzed.  
In order to determine how far a uniform hardened steel barrier must be placed, the shield 
prototype thickness must be defined. In this case, since one of the intended features of this 
personnel blast shield is mobility, the weight of the structure is factor to consider. For this 
reason, a standard plate thickness of ½ inch (12.7 mm) is selected due to its relatively low weight 
and easy replacement in case of damage.  
From the adopted barrier thickness and the factor of safety of 2 calculated in section 
4.3.1, the maximum penetration allowed for the design fragment can be established. Equation 
(4.5) defined the factor of safety as the ratio between the shield thickness and the fragment 
penetration. In other words, the shield thickness must be two times the predicted penetration 
depth. From this, a maximum penetration of ¼ inch (6.35 mm) is defined as the threshold for the 
personnel blast shield. Figure 4.6 (heavy casing) and Figure 4.7 (light casing) show the 
penetration-range curves for the fragment velocities and masses predicted in section 4.1 and 
section 4.2. The red lines represent the fragment penetration limit in inches and range in feet. 
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Figure 4.6 Heavy Casing - Penetration in inches into hardened steel by maximum fragment of 




Figure 4.7 Light Casing - Penetration in inches into hardened steel by maximum fragment of 
0.01925 oz with an initial velocity of 8,296 ft/s 
 
According to the fragment penetration estimation provided by ConWep, a minimum 
standoff distance of 45 feet will be required if the shield is facing a detonation of the heavily 
cased charge studied. On the other hand, this distance will be reduced to 26 feet for the light 
casing. The plots show that the fragmentation from the heavy casing represents a higher hazard 
than the one from the light casing in the medium-long range.  
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It must be emphasized that calculations in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 predict the 
penetration from steel fragments. A different behavior is expected from an aluminum casing such 
the one intended for the light casing. Aluminum is considered a reacting case material along with 
titanium, uranium, etc. These materials will fragment upon detonation and will react with the 
target material upon impact. When the fragments are suddenly stopped, their kinetic energy is 
converted to internal energy and raises the temperatures to the point where significant chemical 
reactions can take place (Needham 2010). Aluminum will burn producing high temperatures but 
reducing its penetration capacity. Therefore for design purposes it is expected that the 
penetration depth predicted in Figure 4.7 will be conservative compared to the actual penetration 
from aluminum fragments onto hardened steel.  
Another fact to take into consideration when studying fragment penetration is the 
hypervelocity regime. Hypervelocity impact occurs when the striking velocity is so high that t e 
strength of materials upon impact is very small compared to inertial stresses. Therefore, 
even metals behave like fluids under hypervelocity impact. Extreme hypervelocity results 
in vaporization of the impactor and target. According to Rosenberg et. al (2012), hypervelocity is 
generally considered to be over 2,000 m/s or 6,500 ft/s for structural metals. It is expected that 
primary fragments from a fragmenting casing present a “chunky” shape that ends in high-drag 
velocity attenuation during flight. Estimations of the contour where hypervelocity impact is 
expected can be performed using several formulations for the prediction of the fragment striking 
velocity. For the heavy and light casings studied in this section, the minimum standoff distances 
predicted fall out of the hypervelocity impact range. 
 
4.3.3 Personnel Blast Shield Design 
 
Once the blast and fragmentation loads have been assessed, the final step is to design a 
personnel blast shield with geometry and materials that provide a comfortable space for the 
personnel, with relatively good portability, and to ensure the level of safety required. In this 
subsection the final shield geometry and materials will be presented.  
Geometry. The geometry for this design was selected in order to direct possible 
overpressure away from the persons sheltered behind the blast shield. Initially, a V-shaped blast 
shield seemed more appropriate due to the nature of the blast loads. However, other parameters 
such as the capacity of operating personnel shall be taken into consideration. When designing the 
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angles of the blast shield, it is critical to consider the constructive interference that can form from 
the reflection of a shock wave off a surface (section 4.1). The blast shield geometry has been 
designed in order to prevent this from happening, ensuring oblique reflection of the blast wave. 
Drawings of the final design by Paul Bradley (Bradley Metals CO Inc.) are included in Figure 
4.8 and in Appendix E.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Personnel blast shield drawings (by Paul Bradley) 
 
Materials. The blast shield prototype is constructed primarily of a ½ inch AR400F plate. 
AR400F is a through-hardened, abrasion-resistant plate with a nominal hardness of 400HBW. 
This product is intended for applications where a good combination of abrasion resistance, 
formability, and weld-ability is desired. Mechanical properties, chemical composition and 
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manufacturer test certificate are available in Appendix F. 
The windows of the blast shield are made of 1” thick LEXGARD® MP1000 laminate. 
The windows measure 5” high and 14” in length. LEXGARD® MP1000 laminate is a four-ply 
polycarbonate laminate primarily developed for security protection. MP1000 laminate combines 
dependable ballistic protection and exceptional abrasion resistance. Material shall have a flexural 
strength not less than 13,500 psi (ASTM D790); 72% light transmission (ASTM D1003). 
Material shall be a total thickness of 1.03 ± 5%. Material shall have an abrasion resistance 
surface to improve service life performance, and must conform with ICBO, BOCA, and SBCCI 
Model Building Codes as an Approved Light-Transmitting Plastic with a C1 (CC-1) 
flammability. Mechanical properties, chemical composition and manufacturer test certificate are 
available in Appendix E.  
The whole blast shield prototype weighs approximately 3,500 pounds and has the 
capacity for three operators to stand inside. Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 show different 
perspectives of the actual prototype. 
 
 




Figure 4.10 Personnel blast shield back view 
 
The personnel blast shield can be mounted on a trailer for easy transportation during the 
execution of explosives operations. For this purpose, the shield includes an angle iron with 
multiple holes at the bottom of the frame for bolting to the trailer. An example of the setup is 
shown in Figure 4.11. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Mobile blast shield bolted on a trailer  
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CHAPTER 5 EXPERIMENTAL TESTING 
 
The goal of this chapter is to experimentally test the performance of the blast shield 
against blast overpressure and fragmentation loads, as well as its effectiveness as a protection 
device. A total of eleven tests were conducted at the Explosive Research Laboratory (ERL) site 
of the Colorado School of Mines near Idaho Springs, Colorado. Eight of them were performed 
on November 10th and 11th, 2014 and their goal was to test the shield response to the blast and 
fragmentation loads for two types of explosives, Pentolite and Composition B (Test Series A). 
The other three tests were performed on March 10th, 2 16 using only Pentolite charges for 
measuring the blast overpressure inside the personnel blast shield (Test Series B). 
All testing was conducted in the ERL blasting pit at an elevation of 8,000 feet. The 
weather conditions during the first test series were cloudy with light snow and temperatures 
between 10 and 20 degrees Fahrenheit. For the second series, the weather was sunny with a 
temperature of 65 degrees Fahrenheit. The atmospheric pressure provided by the local weather 
station was near 1 atm in spite of the elevation. 
All tests but one represented an above ground detonation where the charge was raised 3 
feet above the ground. One single test was done with the charge resting on the ground to 
compare of the blast effects. 
 
5.1 Explosives Charges 
 
 Two different types of commercial and military high explosive materials were used: 
Pentolite and Composition B. The condensed phase explosives were located inside the body of 
two types of common rounds used in avalanche control: the CIL Orion´s Classic system (Figure 
5.1) and the Delta K´s DeltaLancer (Figure 5.2).  
The CIL Orion’s Classic system is comprised of four main parts: the fore-body, the 
arming tail fin assembly, the CIL Avalauncher High strength detonator, and the Plastazote pillow 
spacer (CIL Orion 2014). DeltaLancer is a modular, 82.2mm caliber, all plastic, fin stabilized, 
gas launched projectile designed with both nose and/or tail fusing options to support a wide 
range of payloads and operational applications (Delta K Inc.).  The supplier reported a net 
explosive content of 0.9 kg Pentolite for the Classic Stubby and 1kg Composition B for the 
DeltaLancer. However, Delta K reported a full capacity of the DeltaLancer of 1.25 Kg. At first, i  
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seems that there are significant differences in the explosive content for the different rounds, but it 
must be noted that in scaling calculations the cube root of the explosive weight is the governing 
term and the potential error in the blast overpressure and therefore reduces to no worse than 
about 7 percent (Cooper 1994). 
 
 
Figure 5.1 CIL Orion's Classic 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Delta K’s DeltaLancer 
 
5.2 Test Setup and Results 
 
Two almost identical setups were used for the tests performed in 2014 and 2016.  The 
first series of tests (Test Series A) was intended to evaluate the shield response against the blast 
and fragmentation loads. The second series of tests (Tests Series B) were intended to measure the 
blast overpressure attenuation provided by the shield. The blast overpressure was recorded using 
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piezoelectric pressure gauges PCB models 137A21 and 137A23.  
The gauge diaphragm was insulated using common vinyl electrical tape to minimize 
possible signals generated by flash temperatures due to the passing of the shock front. 
Additionally, the bodies of the gauges were isolated from the ground by placing vinyl electrical 
tape in the contact surface with the steel stand (Figure 5.3). 
  
 
Figure 5.3 Piezoelectric pressure gauges setup 
 
The pressure sensors were connected by coaxial cable to a PCB sensor signal conditioner 
model 482C05. The outputs were also connected to the channels of two Tektronix DPO72004C 
Oscilloscopes where the signal provided by each gauge was recorded. Triggering was 
implemented from the firing system and a signal differentiator that provided a 2 volt output to 









5.2.1 Test Series A 
 
 In test series A, the fragment retention against light casing and overall shield 
performance against blast and thermal loadings are evaluated. In this test series, four transducers 
were offset from the detonation source. Transducers 2 and 4 were placed 16 feet from the point 
of initiation, transducer 1 at 25 feet, and transducer 3 was placed 29 feet from the detonation 
source. The blast shield was placed 23.5 feet from ground zero (GZ). Blast data was collected by 
the pressure gauges to determine the peak overpressure and the duration of the shockwave acting 
upon the blast shield. A total of eight tests were performed using different explosives. 
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 show the position of the blast shield, the pressure transducers, 
and the cameras relative to ground zero in the test arena.  
 
 




The charge was hung 3 feet above the ground by a rope tied to a metal support structure. 
The pressure transducers were also placed 3 feet above the ground and pointed towards GZ.  The 
personnel blast shield was placed in the arena in order to observe its performance during the 
tests. A Phantom V711 camera was used to capture close-up views of the charge detonating 
while a Photron High Speed Camera was used for an overview of the entire arena.   
 
 
Figure 5.5 Picture of the experimental setup for test series A 
 
Tests 1 through 4 used the CIL Orion (Pentolite) with the axis oriented vertically (Figure 
5.6, left). Test 5 used the DeltaLancer (Composition B) also with the axis oriented vertically 
(Figure 5.6, right). Test 6 had the CIL Orion tilted in the plane parallel to the face of the shield.  
Tests 7 and 8 had the DeltaLancer charges similarly tilted.  Tests 4 and 8 had a metal casing 




                                                         





Figure 5.7 DeltaLancer suspended 3 feet above the ground with an elevation of 30 degrees and 






A Phantom V711 camera was used for close-up views of the charge detonating while a 
Photron High Speed Camera was used for an overview of the entire arena. Figure 5.8 shows 
various high-speed camera frames during the detonation of a DeltaLancer round within a 1/8in 
aluminum casing.   
 
 
Figure 5.8 High speed camera frames of the detonation of a cased explosive 
 
One particular effect previously discussed is observed on the shield surface in Figure 5.8. 
When the aluminum fragments from the casing impact the shield, oxidation of the aluminum 
takes place. The surface of aluminum metal is covered with a thin layer of oxide that helps 
protect the metal from attack by air. So normally, aluminum metal does not react with air. If the 
oxide layer is damaged, the aluminum metal is exposed. Aluminum will burn in oxygen with a 
brilliant white flame to form trioxide aluminum (III) oxide, Al2O3.  
Figure 5.9 shows the shield after the test execution with different fragment impacts on its 
surface. Several aluminum fragments were recovered after the test and are shown in Figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.9 shows very few signs on the shield surface after the blast. The shield 
successfully withstood thermal, overpressure, and fragmentation loads from the bare and cased 
explosive charges with minimum effects on the shield materials. Fragment penetration was found 
to be significantly less than that estimated by ConWep in Figure 4.6. This is due in part to the 
weakened penetration capacity of the aluminum fragmentation versus the steel fragmentation 
predicted by ConWep.  
The aluminum fragment shown in Figure 5.10 has approximate dimensions ranging from 
4 mm to 7 mm in the transverse and longitudinal directions. In table 4.3, average and maximum 
areas for the heavy and light casing were predicted using the Mott model. For light casing, the 
areas correspond to 0.0143 in2 (9.2258 mm2) for an average fragment mass and 0.0273 in2 
(17.6129 mm2) for a maximum fragment mass. If we assume the standard fragment shape is 
assumed (Figure 4.5), the estimated fragment diameters correspond to 3.4273 mm for an average 
fragment and 4.7355 mm for the maximum fragment. The fragment recovered fits into this range 
of values despite several assumptions made during the estimation of the fragmentation for 
aluminum casing.  
The blast overpressure versus time data was obtained from the pressure transducer 
readings during the eight different tests.  In order to make the data more readable, the data was 
truncated at the return-to baseline point after the arrival of the initial shock wave.  In order to 
compensate for baseline drift in the transducer signal conditioning circuitry, the baseline of each 
transducer signal was forced to zero. 
One of the pressure transducer cables was cut during test 4 prior to shock arrival, so no 
data was obtained for that channel.  In test 3, there was a fragment hit pressure transducer 2 and 
caused a significant ringing of the signal.  However, the ringing dampened prior to shock arrival.  
This was unexpected as this was not a fragmenting test. It is unclear what the fragment was, but 
it could have been a significant piece of the plastic casing.  Pressure transducer 2 during test 2 
shows a similar event with a much smaller amount of ringing on the signal. 
The fragmenting tests (4 and 8) show the influence of fragmentation, which is evidenced 
by higher noise levels on the signal prior to shock arrival. This is caused by fragments flying out 
ahead of the blast wave at these distances. The supersonic regimes of these fragments generate 
shock waves that are noticeable in the overpressure-time plots.  The fragment arrival time at each 
transducer location is indicated by the change in baseline noise. Also visible on many of the plots 
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are short spikes close to time zero. This is interference from the Exploding Bridge Wire firing 
system. These spikes are harmless because they only occur close to time zero and are completely 
dissipated prior to shock arrival. Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 show examples of the pressure-time 
plots for the bare CIL Orion (Pentolite) and the cased DeltaLancer (Composition B) respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Test 2 Pressure-time plots. Bare CIL Orion (Pentolite) in vertical position 
 
 Figure 5.11 shows the overpressure-time plots recorded by the different free-field 
transducers during test 2. Almost identical profiles are seen at 16 feet away from ground zero. 
Moving away from the burst (blue and red plots), the blast peak overpressure decreases while the 
positive duration increases. It must be noted that the second pressure peak recorded by 
transducers 2 and 4 is at 16 feet from ground zero. This second peak is a result of the shock wave 
reflecting off the ground. For transducers 1 and 3, a single peak can be observed thus the Mach 
stem is expected to be formed at those ranges (see Section 4.1). 
Incident Blast Waves 
at 16 feet from GZ 
Reflected Blast Waves 
at 16 feet from GZ 
Incident Blast wave 
at 25 feet from GZ 
Incident Blast Wave at 
29 feet from GZ 
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Figure 5.12 Test 8 Pressure-time plots. Cased DeltaLancer (Composition B) Tilted 45 degrees 
 
Figure 5.12 is significantly noisier than 5.11 due to the flight of supersonic fragments 
nearby. Initially, one might think that the increase in the signal noise could be attributed to direct 
fragment impact. However, a direct impact usually produces oscillations of a much higher 
amplitude and frequency. 
 Pressure and impulse values were collected for the different tests and presented in table   
5.1 organized by pressure sensor distance to GZ. The rest of the pressure transducer plots for test 







Incident Blas Waves 
at 16 feet from GZ 
Reflected Blast Waves 
at 16 feet from GZ 
Incident Blast Wave 
at 25 feet from GZ 
Incident Blast Wave 
at 29 feet from GZ 
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Table 5.1 Test data collection sorted by distance for test series A 
Charge Distance (ft) Transducer Test Peak (psi) Impulse (psi-ms) 
CIL Orion 16 2 1 6.01 4.92 
CIL Orion 16 4 1 6.34 4.40 
CIL Orion 16 2 2 6.36 5.47 
CIL Orion 16 4 2 6.75 5.19 
CIL Orion 16 2 3 6.25 4.93 
CIL Orion 16 4 3 6.02 7.28 
Cased CIL Orion 16 2 4 cable cut cable cut 
Cased CIL Orion 16 4 4 3.00 12.01 
DeltaLancer 16 2 5 4.88 3.61 
DeltaLancer 16 4 5 7.11 5.46 
CIL Orion Tilted 16 2 6 5.57 4.88 
CIL Orion Tilted 16 4 6 8.79 11.54 
DeltaLancer Tilted 16 2 7 9.80 12.93 
DeltaLancer Tilted 16 4 7 9.79 12.96 
Cased DeltaLancer Tilted 16 2 8 7.12 13.66 
Cased DeltaLancer Tilted 16 4 8 8.03 10.97 
CIL Orion 25 3 1 3.80 8.80 
CIL Orion 25 3 2 3.65 9.12 
CIL Orion 25 3 3 3.69 8.66 
Cased CIL Orion 25 3 4 3.20 7.56 
DeltaLancer 25 3 5 4.31 10.23 
CIL Orion Tilted 25 3 6 3.35 8.30 
DeltaLancer Tilted 25 3 7 3.88 9.61 
Cased DeltaLancer Tilted 25 3 8 3.83 9.02 
CIL Orion 29 1 1 2.88 6.65 
CIL Orion 29 1 2 2.99 6.47 
CIL Orion 29 1 3 3.06 6.50 
Cased CIL Orion 29 1 4 2.49 5.33 
DeltaLancer 29 1 5 3.38 7.67 
CIL Orion Tilted 29 1 6 3.10 7.25 
DeltaLancer Tilted 29 1 7 3.11 7.45 
Cased DeltaLancer Tilted 29 1 8 2.87 7.54 
 
 
5.2.1 Test Series B 
 
 In the experimental design for test series B, four transducers were offset from the 
detonation source and three were placed inside the blast shield. Transducer 1 and 2 were placed 
at 16 feet from the point of initiation, transducer 3 at 25 feet, and transducer 4 was placed at 50 
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feet from the detonation source. The blast shield was placed 23.5 feet from the detonation site. 
Blast data was collected using the pressure gauges to determine the peak overpressure and 
duration of the shock wave acting upon the blast shield. A total of three tests were conducted 
using the CIL Orion rounds (Pentolite).  
Figure 5.13 through Figure 5.16 show the position of the blast shield, pressure 
transducers, and cameras relative to ground zero in the test arena. For the first test in series B, the 
charge was resting on the ground. In the following two, the charge was hung 3 feet above 
ground. The outside pressure transducers were placed 3 feet above the ground and pointed 
towards GZ.  The personnel blast shield was placed in the arena in order to observe its 
performance during the tests and measure the blast overpressure inside. A Phantom V711 camera 
was used for an overview of the entire arena.   
 
 




Figure 5.14 Picture of the experimental setup for test series B 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Picture of inside transducers for test series B  
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Figure 5.16 Detail of inside transducers for test series B; Transducers 5 and 7 have their sensing 
element normal to the ground pointing outwards; Transducer 1 has its sensing element parallel to 
the ground pointing upwards 
 
Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 show the piezoelectric pressure gauges placed inside the 
shield. The purpose of these transducers is to measure the blast overpressure and impulse from 
the engulfing blast wave inside the shield. Various difficulties are found in measuring the 
overpressure inside the shield using free-field transducers because a complex flow forms.  As the 
blast wave engulfs the blast shield, vortices appear on the edges of the structure and the flow 
direction is no longer predictable.  
For this configuration, three pencil gauges were placed on a steel stand forming a 90 
degree fan pattern. The sensing elements for gauges 5 and 7 were pointed outwards, normal to 
the plane of the ground. The sensing element for gauge 6 was pointed upwards parallel to the 
plane of the ground. The purpose was to measure the engulfing blast in the different possible 
directions of incidence. Table 5.2 summarizes the peak overpressure and impulse measured by 
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the outside gauges during test series B. Table 5.3 summarizes peak pressure values and A-
durations for the gauges placed inside the shield. The A-duration is defined as the duration of the 
first overpressure for an impulse noise (US Army DA PAM 40-501 2015). 
 
Table 5.2 Test data collection for the outside transducers during test series B 
Detonation Distance (ft) Transducer Test Peak (psi) Impulse (psi-ms) 
Surface 16 1 1 6.07 6.85 
Surface 16 2 1 6.48 11.13 
Above Ground 16 1 2 6.76 13.52 
Above Ground 16 2 2 6.64 15.27 
Above Ground 16 1 3 6.36 12.08 
Above Ground 16 2 3 6.71 14.09 
Surface 25 3 1 3.14 6.90 
Above Ground 25 3 2 3.86 8.40 
Above Ground 25 3 3 3.82 6.68 
Surface 50 4 1 0.98 3.94 
Above Ground 50 4 2 1.36 5.71 
Above Ground 50 4 3 1.34 5.76 
 
Table 5.3 Test data collection for the inside transducers during test series B 
Detonation Distance (ft) Transducer Test Peak (psi) A-Duration (ms) 
Surface 25 5 1 0.295 6.3 
Surface 25 6 1 0.841 9.2 
Surface 25 7 1 0.284 5.3 
Above Ground 25 5 2 0.438 7.0 
Above Ground 25 6 2 1.180 9.5 
Above Ground 25 7 2 0.392 7.0 
Above Ground 25 5 3 0.478 5.4 
Above Ground 25 6 3 1.179 9.4 
Above Ground 25 7 3 0.333 6.4 
 
According to the results presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, the above ground 
detonations seem to generate higher blast overpressure values in the medium-long range. This is 
in agreement with the Mach reflection theory introduced in section 4.1. Figure 5.16 shows the 
comparison between the overpressure-range plot at 50 feet from GZ for the surface and above-
ground burst tests. 
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Figure 5.16 Overpressure-time histories at 50 feet from GZ for test series B 
 
Figure 5.16 shows the differences in the peak overpressure between a surface burst and 
an above-ground burst for an identical explosive charge. The black plot shows the overpressure 
history at 50 feet from GZ when the charge was resting on the ground. Red and blue plots 
represent the overpressure versus time at 50 feet from the GZ when the explosive charge was 
raised 3 feet above the ground. Both plots are almost identical although a time lag of about 3 
milliseconds is observed. This time lag was likely induced by the electric detonator. At 50 feet 
from GZ, the overpressure increased almost 40 percent due only to the change in the relative 
charge position. Several reflected peaks can be also observed in the three plots. These peaks are 
due to the multiple shock reflections against the concrete walls in the test arena. It is important to 
note that placing the blast shield in the path of the pressure transducer would have a significant 
effect on the propagation of the blast wave. However, the blast wave is expected to heal after 
approximately 5 times the dimension of the structure in the direction perpendicular to the flow 
(Needham 2010). In this case, approximately 15 feet behind the shield or 40 feet from ground 
zero. 
 
Reflected peaks from 
concrete walls 
Peak overpressure  
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The main reason why test series B was performed was to measure the overpressure inside 
the blast shield. As presented in Table 5.3, pressure transducer 6 (Figure 5.16) gave considerably 
higher values of overpressure than transducers 5 and 7. This is reasonable considering the 
orientation of the diaphragms. Transducer 6 experiences the flow coming from the top and both 
sides of the shield while transducers 5 and 7 only experience the flow arriving from their side. 
According to Table 5.3, the difference in the peak overpressure at 25 feet from the outside and 
inside transducers is 73.2 percent for test 1 (surface burst), 69.4 percent for test 2 (above ground 
burst), and 69.1 percent for test 3 (above ground burst). Figure 5.17 shows a comparison between 
the overpressure-time plots inside and outside the blast shield at 25 feet from GZ. 
 
Figure 5.17 Overpressure-time plots inside and outside the shield at 25 feet from GZ 
 
 Significant differences in peak overpressure and rise time can be observed in both graphs. 
The black plot shows the typical blast wave profile with an almost instantaneous rise and smooth 
decay, while the red one makes a more rounded peak indicating a compressive wave. The red 
plot has been adjusted in phase for a better visualization of both transducer readings. The actual 
arrival of the compressive wave inside the shield takes place over 12 milliseconds later.  
Peak overpressure  
Reflected shock from 
concrete walls 
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CHAPTER 6 NUMERICAL SIMULATION 
 
In this chapter, a three dimensional numerical simulation is performed using the 
hydrocode ANSYS Autodyn in order to verify the blast overpressure attenuation provided by the 
personnel blast shield. The blast gauge setup used in test series B (Figure 5.16) to measure the 
overpressure inside the shield presented some complications since their readings are influenced 
by the direction of the flow. As mentioned in previous sections, a high vorticity region was 
expected to form from the blast wave engulfing the shield making it difficult to obtain fully 
reliable gauge records. One advantage of numerical modeling is that it allows simulation of a 
three dimensional environment where the blast wave interacts with objects and structures in a 
complex manner. Additionally, absolute values of overpressure or temperature can be calculated 
for every single region of the model removing the directional component imposed by the 
experiments.  
Pressure versus time plots will then be obtained for several points inside and outside the 
shield using ANSYS Autodyn. The results will be compared to those obtained from test series A 
and B. ANSYS Autodyn is an explicit analysis tool for modeling nonlinear dynamics of solids, 
fluids and gases as well as their interaction. These types of codes are referred to as “hydrocodes” 
where equations of mass, momentum, and energy conservation coupled with material 
descriptions are solved (Fairlie 1998). Complex physical phenomena such as the propagation of 
shock waves can be modeled with a high level of accuracy. 
 
6.1. Model Setup 
 
The three dimensional model is created in two steps. First, a two dimensional simulation 
models the detonation and subsequent expansion of the detonation products in air. Second, the 
results of the simulation are remapped into a 3D eulerian space where the interaction between the 
reacted products and the blast shield geometry take place.  
 
6.1.1 Remapping Simulation 
 
This remapping technique uses an initial explosion calculation to set up the initial 
conditions for the subsequent calculation stage in order to improve computational efficiency and 
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solution accuracy (Fairlie 1998).  A 2.2 lb pentolite charge was built in order to emulate the body 
of the CIL Orion Classic used during test series B (Figure 5.1). First, an axial-symmetric 2D 
eulerian space was built and filled with both air and the cylindrical pentolite charge. The mesh 
size for this first simulation is 5 millimeters and the initiation point is placed at one of the ends of 
the charge (Figure 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Two-dimensional remapping simulation – Setup 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Two-dimensional remapping simulation – Pressure Contour  
Initiation Point 
Symmetry Axis 





 Figure 6.2 shows the pressure contour in air for the 2D simulation of the cylindrical 
pentolite charge. The higher pressure values were produced at 90 degrees from the charge axis. 
For non-spherical charges, the shock wave will not enter the surrounding air as a spherical wave, 
or at the same instant over the entire charge surface. The shape and strength of the shock wave 
entering the air will depend both upon charge geometry, and upon the relative location at which 
the initiation occurrs. The blast parameters will be functions not only of radial standoff, but also 
of azimuth and possibly elevation (Esparza 1992). The reason for this phenomenon is that 
explosive materials tend to drive the energy to their largest surface area.  
In this case, because of the way that the primary shock wave expands for cylindrical 
charges, larger values of blast overpressure can be observed at 90 degrees from the explosive 
axis. According to Esparza (1992), the overpressure generated by a cylindrical explosive for a 
certain scaled distance charge can be obtained from standard blast overpressure curves by first 
obtaining the spherical equivalency factor for that cylindrical charge. The spherical equivalency 
factors were determined in a similar way as TNT equivalency weights are generally found. As 
one moves away from the center of the blast, the shock traveling through the air ultimately 
follows a spherical expansion.  
 
  6.1.2 Three dimensional Model 
 
Once the initial conditions have been modeled, the next step consists of simulating the 
environment for which the blast shield was designed and experimentally tested. First, a 
simplified geometry of the blast shield was created in order to reduce the computational effort 
(Figure 6.3). This geometry will be set as a lagragian rigid body with symmetry along the plane 
normal to the ground surface. This geometry will be placed in the path of the blast wave as it 
expands. Some discussion is needed for the assumption of modeling the shield as a rigid body. 
According to Needham (2010), a blast wave interacting with a solid behaves very similarly 
whether the object is rigid or responding. In general, if the response time of the structure is 
greater than half the positive duration of the blast wave, or the propagation time of the blast wave 




Figure 6.3 Blast shield geometry actual geometry (left) and simplified geometry (right) 
 
The next step was to create the simulated operational environment. A box-shaped 
eulerian space is built and filled with still air, the rigid shield body and the remapped pentolite 
simulation. The mesh size is 35 millimeters. Outflow boundary conditions are imposed in all 
planes except the ground and the symmetry plane.  
Several gauges are also placed in the eulerian space to measure the changes in the 
properties of the air after the passage of the blast wave. A gauge array is positioned in line with 
the center of the explosion at 1 meter above the ground and spaced by 1 meter (gauges 1 through 
9). The purpose of this array is to measure the pressure versus range and therefore validate the 
model accuracy versus the analytical and experimental values. Additionally, multiple gauges are 
placed inside the blast shield for the validation of the measured overpressures by the 
piezoelectric gauges (Figure 5.16) and also for the prediction of the pressure at different 
locations inside the shield. This is critical for two reasons: first, the design capacity of the shield 
is three operators and different overpressures will be experienced depending on their relative 
position inside the shield, second, for the values of overpressure expected, the most vulnerable 
organ is the ears thus the pressure must be measured at their possible height. Figure 6.4 shows 




Figure 6.4 Three dimensional model setup 
 
6.2 Model Results and Comparison 
 
The model runs for 55 milliseconds to record positive and negative duration of the 
compressive wave that propagates inside the shield. The simulation sequence is shown in Figure 
6.5. The representation of velocity vectors in the plot provide a good understanding of how the 
blast wave expands and interacts with the ground and the blast shield. After two milliseconds, 
the primary shock wave has expanded about two meters and a second reflected shock has 
formed. Four milliseconds later (t=6ms), the incident blast wave continues its expansion while 
the Mach stem has already formed due to the interaction between incident and reflected shocks. 
At t=12 ms, the Mach stem has grown to about the height of the blast shield. Finally, after 
eighteen milliseconds, the blast wave has reached the blast shield generating vortices at the 
shield edges that will produce a complex flow pattern inside the shield. In the meanwhile, a 
reflected shock has formed from the interaction of the blast wave and front of the shield, and it 




2.2 lb Pentolite 
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t = 2 ms 
t = 6 ms 
t = 12 ms 
t = 18 ms 
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In section 4.2 the concept of Mach reflection was briefly introduced. According to 
Needham (2010), even though no extra energy is being added, the increase in overpressure is 
caused by a partial stagnation of the dynamic pressure that converts kinetic energy into internal 
energy. The volume into which this energy is confined near Mach transition is restricted to the 
small region between the triple point, the slip line, and the reflecting surface.  
The numerical simulation shown in Figure 6.5 provides a simple visual demonstration of 
such shock wave interaction phenomenon. However, other characteristics of the Mach reflection 
such as the slip line cannot be visualized using the velocity vectors. Additionally, it must be 
mentioned that the model assumes a perfectly flat unyielding ground surface. Reflection of the 
blast wave against a rough ground surface may influence the pressure at the front, generally 
showing lower peaks and longer durations (Needham 2010). 
Validation of the blast wave parameters calculated by the numerical simulations is 
necessary at this point. Therefore, the blast parameter peak overpressure obtained by the various 
methods will be analyzed in order to estimate the accuracy of the numerical model. Figure 6.5 
shows the peak overpressure-range for a 2.2 lb pentolite charge obtained by different means.  
 
 
Figure 6.5 Peak overpressure-range by various methods for a 2.2 lb pentolite charge  
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The two curves represent a hemispherical surface burst and a spherical free-air burst for a 
2.668 lb TNT charge calculated using the “Kingery and Bulmash” equation and the “Kinney and 
Graham” equation respectively. This weight of TNT is adopted from ConWep´s library that uses 
a fixed TNT equivalence for pentolite of 1.21. The use of a single value of TNT equivalency 
may be arguable, but it is out of the scope of this work. For more details about this matter, please 
see references Kleine (2003) and Cooper (1994). Additionally, experimental peak overpressure 
values measured during test series A and B are plotted along with 10 percent error bars. Peak 
overpressure values obtained from the numerical simulation at gauges 4, 5, and 6 are also plotted 
along with 10 percent error bars. The graph only shows the range 10 to 30 feet for a better 
visualization of the information. 
In general, Figure 6.5 demonstrates agreement between the experiment and the numerical 
model. For the numerical model, only three data points are plotted. Gauges 1 through 3 were out 
of the horizontal scale range. For gauge 6 and beyond, the readings are influenced by the 
interaction between the blast wave and the shield (Figure 6.6) 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Numerical model exterior gauge history  
 
Reflected Overpressure 
from the Shield 
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Interesting conclusions may be extracted from Figure 6.5. At close range (16 feet), it can 
be observed that the scatter of peak overpressure values is in general higher than those from a 
spherical free-air burst, probably due to the cylindrical geometry of the CIL Orion, but also 
lower than the hemispherical surface burst since the ground is expected to almost double the 
yield. However, at medium range (25 feet) and long range (29 feet), the scatter of experim ntal 
data points overtakes both free-air and surface bursts due presumably to the Mach stem 
formation. In general, we can verify that surface bursts produce higher overpressures than above 
ground bursts in the close range, but lower values in the medium-long range (Glasstone 1977). 
Once the values provided by the numerical simulation were validated by the experimental 
results, the next step was to analyze the overpressure inside the shield after the passage of the 
blast wave. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the main interest in building a 
numerical model of the operational environment was to verify the peak pressure values measured 
by the transducer fan pattern inside the shield. Figure 6.7 shows the experimental and numerical 
pressure-time plots obtained from the piezoelectric transducer 6 (Figure 5.16) and gauge 8 
(Figure 6.4). Transducer 6 and gauge 8 were placed at identical locations in the experimental 
tests and numerical model environments. 
 





Figure 6.7 demonstrates excellent agreement between the experiments and the numerical 
model for the values of peak overpressure and A-duration. The experimental and numerical data 
also follows a closely overlapping path at the beginning of the negative phase until a second peak 
appears in the experimental graphs. This second peak acts to decouple the numerical and 
experimental plots, which is presumably due to the reflection of the wave against the steel stand 
in the gauge configuration (Figure 5.16). After that second peak, both experimental pressure 
readings were unintentionally cropped during testing thus the peak negative values cannot be 
determined. The numerical model also shows two clearly defined peaks during the positive 
duration. These distinct peaks are likely associated with the flow arriving from the top and sides 
of the shield at two different times. 
The compressive wave showed in Figure 6.7 shows a peak overpressure value of 
approximately 1.2 psi for the experimental and numerical data. This value is about 48 percent 
lower than the blast overpressure criteria specified in the DoD Standards MIL-STD-398A Test 
101 (2.3 psi). However, the measurements were taken at a convenient location for comparison 
with the exterior gauges (25 feet from GZ and 3 feet above ground). In order to evaluate the 
safety of the shielded operators, the overpressure at critical spots inside the shield must be 
evaluated, and the peak pressure must be below 2.3 psi.  
In the numerical 3D model, several gauges were placed at different positions inside the 
shield where the personnel are expected to be located. Two gauges were positioned at the center 
of probable head locations of each operator following the procedure described in MIL-STD-
398A. For standing positions, the gauges shall be positioned at 65 in (1.65 meters) above the 
floor. As shown in the three-dimensional model setup (Figure 6.4), these are gauges 13 (for the 
operator standing in the middle), and gauge 15 (for the operators in the sides). The gauges are 
also placed 1 meter inside the shield with respect to its depth.  
The gauges history provided by the model for gauges 13 and 15 is shown in Figure 6.8. 
The graph shows very similar compressive waves as the one shown in Figure 6.7. However, 
slightly higher values of peak overpressure can be observed, specifically 1.54 psi for the gauge 
located in the middle (gauge 13), and 1.34 for the gauge on the side (gauge 15). These higher 
values are expected to be caused by two main factors: first, the gauges are positioned 1.65 meter 
above the ground and the compressive wave arrives earlier to the gauge at 1 meter above ground; 
second, a partial stagnation of the flow engulfing the shield takes place inside of it.  
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Figure 6.8 Autodyn 3D internal gauge histories at 65 in (1.65 m) above the floor 
 
 The values shown in Figure 6.8 reflect peak pressures of 1.54 psi and 1.34 psi for the 
critical locations inside the shield at the probable head locations of each operator. For an operator 
standing in the middle position (gauge 13), the obtained value of peak pressure is a 33 percent 
lower than the limit specified in MIL-STD-398A criteria for passing the blast overpressure test 
(test method 101). For an operator standing in the side position (gauge 15), the obtained value of 
peak pressure is a 42 percent lower than the limit specified in MIL-STD-398A criteria for 
passing the blast overpressure test (test method 101). According to these values, operators 
wearing hearing protection shall be safe while using the shield according to the peak noise limit 
established in Table 3.3. It must be remembered that the experimental and numerical values 
shown are for an above ground detonation. 53 percent lower pressure values were recorded by 






CHAPTER 7 MIMIMUM SAFETY DISTANCES FOR GENERAL PUBLIC 
 
 The last section of this document is intended to provide a review of the current existing 
methods and formulas for the calculation of the safety distance for non-essential personnel while 
performing operations with bare and cased explosives. Distance ensures protection against 
damage from explosion. Every operation involving the use of explosive materials requires not 
only ensuring the safety of the personnel, but also the safety of the general public. The distances 
past experiences have shown that offered a considerable degree of protection in various 
explosion situations have been organized into Quantity-Distance Tables and Formulas. These 
provide minimum distance that specific stores of explosives, accidental, or intentional 
detonations should be away from inhabited buildings, other explosives, etc., in order to avoid 
possible harmful effects (Kinney et al. 1985). 
 As stated in previous sections of this document, the two primary loads to be considered 
for the detonation of cased HE charges are the blast overpressure and the fragmentation.  
Adequate safety distances for preventing missile damage are necessary in situations such 
as bomb disposal work or in evacuation of personnel from a bomb threat. This section presents 
several methods and equations found in the literature for bare and cased explosives charges. 
 
7.1 Safety distances for bare explosives charges 
 
 When considering the detonation of bare high explosives, the main hazard is the air blast 
propagating through air. In Chapter 4 it was shown that the lowest overpressure limit in terms of 
physiological damage from blast waves is the one imposed by the eardrum, and more specifically 
the temporary threshold shift (0.2 psi). However, a more restrictive criterion was the one 
provided by the 140dBP contour introduced in section 3.1.1.2. 140dB is maximum permissible 
impulse noise level in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Beyond this impulse 
noise value, hearing protection is required. Equation (3.1) allows the calculation of this distance 
based on the explosive weight.  
Although, the 140dBP contour provides the most conservative safety distance in terms of 
blast overpressure, both the United States Department of Defense (US DoD) and United Nations 
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) provide a second formulation for minimum 
separation distances for non-essential personnel in the case of intentional detonations. For above 
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ground detonations of non-fragmenting munitions or bare explosives, the equation in English 
units is as follows:  
 = × /                                                               .  
 
Where, D is the distance in feet (not less than 200 ft), and W represents the Net Explosive 
Weight in pounds. This formula is intended for use during intentional detonations and 
corresponds to an estimated incident pressure of 0.065 psi with a probability of window breakage 
between 0% and 0.8% depending the type of windows (DOD 6055-9-STD, Table C2.T2.). For 
distances to public traffic ways or other types of buildings please see reference DOD 6055-9-
STD.  
The UN ITAG 0.180:2011 proposed an almost identical equation to equation (7.1) in 
metric units for the estimation of the range of danger areas when planning the destruction of 
ammunition by open detonation of bare explosives (UN ITAG 0.180:2011, Table 24). All these 
equations for the calculation of the safe separation distances are based on the scaling yield aw
presented in section 2.3.1. Simple verification of these safety distances can be performed by 
calculating the blast overpressure-range for a particular charge considering the physiological 
human response. Different objects and structures have completely different responses to blast 
overpressure and impulses.  The next step will be to analyze how the minimum safe separation 
distance for the general public is affected by the presence of flying fragments. 
 
7.2 Safety distances for cased explosives charges 
 
When dealing with the detonation of cased explosives charges and possible nearby 
unbarricaded people, the main hazard is usually associated to missiles and fragments. Missiles 
are tangible physical objects propelled outward by an explosion. They may be formed from 
debris in the path of the blast wave or they may be formed intentionally. Such intentionally 
formed missiles are termed as fragments (Kinney et al. 1985). Characteristics of these missiles 
and fragments are that they are able to cause severe damage at a distance where the blast wave 
can be well withstood. Additionally, the distances to which missiles can be propelled outward 
from an explosion depend greatly on their initial direction (Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1 Missile trajectory for several launch angles (Ref.: Kinney et al. 1985) 
 
 Section 4.2 provided a simple theoretical procedure for the estimation of the primary 
fragmentation generated from a cased HE charge. As mentioned, the fragmentation behavior of 
cased explosives varies depending on the nature of the casing producing particular patterns (Lees 
2005). Fragments of the case are generally projected normal to the inner surface on which the 
pressure of the explosive gases acts at the moment of break-up (Christopherson 1946).  
According to Lees (2005), it is also necessary to evaluate the angle of elevation where 
three cases must be considered (Figure 7.2). In the near field, fragments hitting the human target 
are those projected at a low angle of incidence (normal impact). In the medium field, the target is 
struck by some fragment of low trajectory and others of high trajectory (obliquely impact). 
Finally, at the limit of the fragment range, these two trajectories combine approaching the human 





Figure 7.2 Angle of projection in the vertical plane of missiles from a cased explosive (Ref.: 
Lees 2005)  
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In terms of minimum safety distances from cased explosives, several equations have been 
found in the literature. The different methods are presented here for comparison purposes: 
 
7.2.1 Maximum Fragment Distance (Ref.: DOD 6055.9-STD, 2009) 
 
The DOD 6055.9-STD expresses the minimum separation distance by estimation of the 
Maximum Fragment Distance (MFD). The MFD is the calculated maximum distance to which 
any fragment from the cylindrical portion of ammunition or explosive case is expected to be 
thrown by the design mode detonation. This distance does not address fragments produced by 
sections of nose plugs, base plates, boat tails, or lugs. These special fragments, from the non-
cylindrical portions of the case, can travel to significantly greater distances (i.e., >10,000 ft 
[3048 m]) than the calculated maximum distances.  
For the calculation of the MFD, reference DOD 6055.9-STD includes a series of tables 
differentiating different types of casing: robust, non-robust, and extremely heavy cased. The 
criteria for choosing the so called “Sensitivity Group” is to determine which munitions are 
considered robust having two of the following criteria: 
1. Have a ratio of the explosive weight to empty case weight less than 1. 
2. Have a nominal wall thickness of at least 0.4 in [10 mm]. 
3. Have a case thickness/NEW1/3 > 0.05 in/lb1/3 [0.165 cm/kg1/3].  
On the other hand, extremely heavy cased munitions are defined as those robust 
munitions having a cylindrical section case weight to explosive weight ratio > 9. For the 
particularly heavy and light casings studied in this document, heavy casing corresponds to 
extremely heavy cased munitions, and the light casing to non-robust munitions. The equations 
for the calculation of the maximum fragment distance can refer to explosive charge diameter or 
explosive charge weight. Both will be used and compared. The first sets of equations in English 
units are those in terms of the charge diameter for the different types of munitions introduced 
above: 
 
a) Robust munitions = × . − . ×ln                                        .  
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b) Extremely heavy cased munitions = . × .                                                      .  
 
c) Non-robust munitions = × . − . ×ln                                         .  
 
Where MFD represents the maximum fragment distance in feet, and D is the outer case diameter 
in inches. Applying equations (7.3) and (7.4) to the heavy and light casings respectively, the 
following maximum fragment distances are obtained: 
 
Table 7.1 Minimum safety distance for heavy and light casings (DOD 6055.9-STD, 2009 – C9.T35) 
Casing Type Charge Weight of Casing Diameter Minimum Safety Distance 
Heavy Casing 2.2 lb 29.81 lb 4.7 in a 2,456 ft b  
Light Casing 2.2 lb 1.55 lb 3.5 in 1,688 ft c 
a This value represents an equivalent diameter for the total mass of steel of the multilayer avalauncher type 1 body. 
b This value is obtained from equation (7.3). 
c This value is obtained from equation (7.4). 
 
According to table 7.1, the detonation of the heavy casing charge would propel fragments 
further than the light casing with a difference in range of about a 32 percent.  Next, the same 
calculations will be performed using the equations that provide the maximum fragment distance 
in terms of charge mass: 
 
a) Robust munitions = + . × ln                                            .  
 
b) Extremely heavy cased munitions = + . × ln                                           .  
 
c) Non-robust munitions = . + . × ln                                        .  
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Where MFD represents the maximum fragment distance in feet, and W is the net weight of 
explosives in pounds. Applying equations (7.6) and (7.7) to the heavy and light casings 
respectively, the following maximum fragment distances are obtained: 
 
Table 7.2 Minimum safety distance for heavy and light casings (DOD 6055.9-STD, 2009– C9.T36) 
Casing Type Charge Weight of Casing Diameter Minimum Safety Distance 
Heavy Casing 2.2 lb 29.81 lb 4.7 in a 3,202 ft b  
Light Casing 2.2 lb 1.55 lb 3.5 in 1,713 ft c 
a This value represents an equivalent diameter for the total mass of steel of the multilayer avalauncher type 1 body. 
b This value is obtained from equation (7.6). 
c This value is obtained from equation (7.7). 
 
According to table 7.2, the detonation of the heavy casing charge would propel fragments 
further than the light casing with a difference in range of about a 47 percent. Additionally, one 
may observe a significant different in the values obtained using each methodology. Specifically, 
26 percent difference in fragment range for the heavy casing, and only 1.5 percent for the light 
casing. The second calculation method in terms of explosive weight provided higher values of 
MFD for both types of casing.  
After calculating the range for blast overpressure using equation (7.1) – 427 feet for 2.2 
pounds of explosives – the values for safety distances for the general public would be those 
shown in table 7.2 since they are the most restrictive distances for explosion hazards. It must be 
noted that these distances apply for intentional detonations. Calculated or measured fragment 
throw distance with a safety factor determined by the DoD Component may be used to replace 
these distances. For more details regarding the application of these procedures, please see 
reference DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards (DOD 6055.9-STD, 2009). 
 
 
7.2.2 Simple Range Safety Distances I (Ref.: UN IATG 01.80:2011 [E])  
 
The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) from the United Nations 
Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) provides a set of formulas for the calculation of the 
safety distances from bare and cased munitions. The following simple safety distances can be 
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used to estimate range danger areas when planning the destruction of ammunition by open 
detonation. They may be used for ‘quick planning’ on demolition ranges with existing danger 
areas. If used on demolition areas with no formal danger areas the user should remember that the 
distance produced by these equations is that distance outside which no more than one fragment 
would be expected to fly.  
In the following equations, D represents the safety distance in meters; and the All Up Weight 
(AUW) is the total weight of the munitions, or munitions including packaging and palletization 
in kilograms. 
 
a) For fragmenting munitions when public access is possible in the demolition range area. 
D = AUW                                                                  .  
 
b) For fragmenting munitions when public access is denied i  the demolition range area. 
D = AUW                                                                  .  
 
Calculations are performed using heavy and light casings with equations (7.8) and (7.9). 
Table 7.3 shows the obtained safety distances in English units considering situations (a) and (b). 
 
Table 7.3 Minimum safety distance for heavy and light casings (UN IATG 01.80:2011 [E]) 
Casing Type Charge Weight of Casing Possible PAa Denied PA
a
 
Heavy Casing 2.2 lb 29.81 lb 3,250 ft b 2,276 ft c 
Light Casing 2.2 lb 1.55 lb 2,273 ft b 1,595 ft c 
a PA stands for Public Access 
b This value is obtained from equation (7.8). 
c This value is obtained from equation (7.9). 
 
According to table 7.3, the safety distance required for the detonation of the heavy casing 
charge would be about 30 percent higher than for the light casing. Additionally, the presence of 
public in the demolition area increases the safety distance by about 30 percent compared to the 
restricted cased.  
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Once again in this case, after calculating the range for blast overpressure using equation 
(7.1) – 427 feet for 2.2 pounds of explosives – the values of safety distances for the general 
public would be those shown in table 7.3 since they are the most restrictive distances for 
explosion hazards. For more details regarding the application of these procedures, please see 
reference International Ammunition Technical Guideline, Formulae for Ammunition 
Management (UN IATG 01.80:2011 [E], 2013). 
 
7.2.3 Simple Range Safety Distances II (Ref.: UN IATG 01.80:2011 [E]) 
 
The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) by the United Nations 
Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) provides an alternative simple equation for the 
calculation of the safety distances from fragmenting munitions.   
The Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization (DSTO) conducted 
research in March 1997 into multi-item demolition of ammunition and explosives. They 
concluded that fragmentation explosion danger areas for multi-item demolitions can be reduced 
to that of the largest Net Explosive Quantity single munition in the demolition provided.  
 =                                                                     .  
 
Where, D represents the safety distance in meters, and the All Up Weight (AUW) is the 
total weight of the munition, or munitions including packaging and palletization in kilograms. 
Calculations are performed using heavy and light casings using equation (7.10). Table 7.4 shows 
the obtained safety distances in English units. 
 
Table 7.4 Minimum safety distance for heavy and light casings (UN IATG 01.80:2011 [E]) 
Casing Type Charge Weight of Casing Minimum Safety Distance 
Heavy Casing 2.2 lb 29.81 lb 2,073 ft 




According to table 7.4, the safety distance required for the detonation of the heavy casing 
charge would be about a 35 percent higher than for the light casing. Results from equation (7.10) 
compare favorably with those from the public access denied equation (7.9).  
Once again in this case, after calculating the range for blast overpressure using equation 
(7.1) – 427 feet for 2.2 pounds of explosives – the values of safety distances for the general 
public would be those shown in table 7.4 since are the most restrictive distances for explosion 
hazards. For more details regarding the application of these procedures, please see reference 
International Ammunition Technical Guideline, Formulae for Ammunition Management (UN 
IATG 01.80:2011 [E], 2013). 
 
7.2.4 Fragments Drag Attenuation  
 
The set of formulas presented in sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.3 provide conservative criteria for 
the estimation of the maximum fragment distance and ultimate safety distances for the 
intentional detonation of fragment munitions. These empirical equations usually include a safety 
factor to overestimate the dispersion of most of the fragments. In general, safety distances 
associated with accidental detonations are less conservative and assess a safety distance based on 
limit hazardous values. General Quantity-Distance criteria for Accidental detonations may be 
found in DOD 6055.09-M, Volume 3.   
The purpose of this last section is to provide an engineering estimate of th hazardous 
range from the type of fragmentation for the heavy and light casings studied. Secondary blast 
damage caused by missiles and fragments was introduced in section 3.2.  Human injury for 
different fragment mass-velocity combinations were shown in Figure 3.3. This last figure shows 
the threshold curves for different body parts below which secondary blast injuries are not 
expected to occur. Therefore, by predicting fragment mass and impact velocity, the level of 
danger presented to unbarricaded people can be estimated.  
Fragment initial velocity, mass, and size were predicted using theoretical equations in 
section 4.2 for heavy and light casings. The next step was to determine the limit impact velocity 




Figure 7.3 Limit impact fragment velocity for non-serious injuries for maximum estimated 
fragment masses from heavy and light casings 
 
According to Figure 7.3, the maximum permissible impact velocity for the type of 
fragmentation generated from the heavy casing is 132 feet per second. On the other hand, a 
maximum permissible impact velocity of 260 feet per second is estimated for the light casing. 
These velocities are much lower than the initial fragment velocities estimated in 4.2.1. using the 
Gurney model. However, since the fragments are flying through atmospheric air, a reduction in 
their velocity is expected from the drag applied by the medium. This velocity attenuation can be 
calculated using the following formula presented in DOE/TIC – 11268: 
 = × − � �0 ��                                                           .  
 
Where VS is the fragment velocity at a distance R in feet from the center of the explosion 
in feet per second; V0 is the initial fragment velocity predicted by the Gurney equation in feet per 
second; A is the area of the fragment; W is the fragment mass; γ0 is the specific weight of air 
(4.438e-5 lb/in); and CD is the drag coefficient which is assumed to be 0.6 for spinning chunky 
fragments. 
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According to equation (7.11), one can estimate the distance at which a fragment should 
not produce serious injuries using the limit impact velocity provided in Figure 7.3. Figure 7.4 
shows the fragment velocity attenuation due to drag for both types of casing.  
 
 
Figure 7.4 Fragment velocity attenuation from drag obtained from equation (7.11) 
 
The minimum distance at which serious injury due to fragment impact is not expected to 
occur is 1,090 feet for the heavy casing and 478 feet for the light casing. Equation (7.11) 
provides a simple prediction of fragment striking velocity due to air drag. This equation does not 
consider trajectories of the fragment and therefore it must be applied with caution. Baker et al. 
(1983) developed a similar analysis where the range is obtained by solving the equations of 
motion in the horizontal and vertical directions. These equations will likely provide a good 
estimation for the flight of fragments but they rely on the accuracy of the predictions or 
measurements of fragment initial velocity, mass, and shape. Because of the uncertainties relating 




7.2.5 Summary of safety distances for the general public 
 
Table 7.5 shows the calculation results for the various methods presented in this section 
7.2. These methods estimate the minimum safety distance for non-essential personnel during an 
intentional detonation of a fragmenting munitions or cased explosives.  
 
Table 7.5 Minimum distance in feet for non-essential personnel for heavy and light casings 
Minimum distance in feet for non-essential personnel   
Reference Heavy Casing Light Casing 
US Department of Defense, Ammunition and Explosives 
Safety Standards – MFD (Charge Diameter) 
2,456 1,688 
US Department of Defense, Ammunition and Explosives 
Safety Standards – MFD (Charge Weight) 
3,202 1,713 
UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, International 
Ammunition Technical Guideline (Possible Public Access) 
3,250 2,273 
UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, International 
Ammunition Technical Guideline (Public Access Denied) 
2,276 1,595 
Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization 
(DSTO) 
2,073 1,350 




Table 7.5 show a considerable difference in the safety distances calculated by each 
different method. However, one may observe that all of them provide distances at least a factor 
of 2 higher than the one predicted for the serious injury threshold. The distances predicted by the 
first five references correspond to intentional detonations of fragmenting munitions or cased 
explosives. Lower values of separation distances can be obtained by considering accidental 
detonations (Ref.: DoD M 6055.09-M-V3). 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
A new protection device was successfully developed and tested against the main hazards 
of bare and cased high explosives. This personnel blast shield has already been adopted into the 
safety equipment used by the Colorado Department of Transportation. Additionally, other 
Departments of Transportation in the United States are considering the use of this device for 
their personnel. 
This document reviewed the main hazards involved in the use of condensed phase 
explosives and demonstrated the necessity for reliable protection for personnel involved in these 
operations. A personnel blast shield has proven to be an effective solution against the potential 
dangers of either intentional or accidental detonations.   
 
 Explosives Loads Evaluation. Two main loads were analyzed: the air blast and the 
fragmentation. Both of them are inherently hazardous, and their effects must be 
mitigated. Since the ear is the most sensitive organ to blast overpressures, threshold 
values were established in terms of eardrum rupture and impulse noise peak level. From 
these values, the required hearing protection and maximum exposure per day were 
determined. Regarding fragmentation, two different types of casings were studied 
including fragment initial velocities, masses, and sizes. The Gurney and Mott models 
are widely accepted as first-order engineering predictions hence why they were used for 
these estimations including several assumptions in their application. Although their 
premises are not totally fulfilled, the results obtained through experimental testing 
showed that the Mott model can provide a good estimation of the fragment masses.  
 
 Blast Shield Design. After evaluation of the expected blast and fragmentation loads, the 
safety required for the design of the personnel barrier was determined. Since the design 
must not fail in the event of unexpected high loads, a safety factor must be properly 
introduced based on the shield material, manufacturing tolerances, nature of the loads, 
and desired reliability. From the blast and fragmentation loadings estimated through 




 Experimental Testing A: Structural Resistance and Fragment Retention Tests. The blast 
shield prototype was subjected to a simulated operational environment where it had to 
withstand the effects of bare and lightly cased high explosive charges. The tested 
environment was particularly severe due to the configuration of the test arena. However, 
the shield successfully passed in a total of eight tests involving blast, thermal, and 
fragmentation hazards with little effect on its surface.  
 
 Experimental Testing B: Blast Attenuation Tests. A second series of tests was developed 
to evaluate the shield competency in diffracting an incident blast wave. This was done 
by measuring the peak pressure inside the shield after it was engulfed by the blast.   
  Three Dimensional Numerical Simulation. The transducer plots were then validated 
using a 3D numerical simulation in ANSYS Autodyn. The results of the hydrocode 
show excellent agreement between the model and experiments for the positive phase of 
the pressure-time plots. A reduction of about 70 percent was measured between the peak 
pressure with and without the shield at 25 feet away from the center of the explosion. 
The peak pressures were also obtained in the numerical simulation at he probable head 
locations of the shielded operators. The peak values are 33 and 42 percent lower than 
the limit specified by the blast attenuation test 101 in the US Department of Defense 
design criteria standard for designing and testing operational shields (MIL-STD-398A). 
  Safety Distances for General Public. Finally, since the safety of the general public is 
also a maximum priority, different methods for the calculation of the safety distances 
were reviewed for bare and cased charges. Although a considerably wide range of 
values were found from the different references, it was verified by a simple analytical 
calculation that all of them include at least a safety factor of 2 when considering the risk 
of flying fragments.  
 
This document has presented the design of a personnel blast shield against the hazard 
from approximately 2.2 lbs. of high explosive charges. One of the advantages of the blast waves 
from condensed phased explosives is their scalability in terms of yield. For a spherical expanding 
shock, the cube-root scaling law proved to be a powerful tool that can be used for calculating 
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safe operational distances from the results presented in this document. Additionally, the steps 
followed throughout this document may help in the analysis of other potential operational 
environments. Currently, CDOT owns more than fifteen blast shields that are used by their 
personnel in every operation that involves the use of explosive materials. 
Future work will be performed by AXPRO in order to validate the fragmentation 
phenomena and shield performance against heavily cased explosive charges. Additionally, the 
thermal loadings will be measured in order to verify that the current blast shield design also 
meets the requirements specified in MIL-STD-398A, Test Method 301 (Heat Flux 
Measurement). This work will be implemented by the AXPRO Group at the Explosive Research 
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Figure A.1 Survival curves predicted for 70 Kg man applicable to free-stream situations where 
the long axis of the body is parallel to the direction of propagation of the shocked blast wave 




Figure A.2 Survival curves predicted for 70 Kg man applicable to free-stream situations where 
the long axis of the body is perpendicular to the direction of propagation of the shocked blast 
wave (Ref.: White et al. 1971)  
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Figure A.3 Survival curves predicted for 70 Kg man applicable to free-stream situations where 
the thorax is near a surface against which a shocked blast wave reflects at normal incidence 
(Ref.: Cooper 1996)  
 
 









Figure A.6 Peak sound pressure levels and B-duration limits for impulse noise (Ref.: MIL-STD-
1474D, Figure 4-1)  
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Figure B.1 Incident and Reflected Overpressure versus Range for 1 Kg Pentolite hemispherical 






Figure B.2 Incident and Reflected Overpressure versus Range for 1 Kg Composition B 
hemispherical surface burst (ConWep) 
  
97  
APPENDIX C ESTIMATED SECTIONAL VIEW OF AVALAUNCHER GAS GUNS 
 
 
Figure B.1 Estimated cross-sectional view of Avalauncher type1. Projectile allocation in loaded 





Figure B.1 Estimated cross-sectional view of Avalauncher type2. Projectile allocation in loaded 




APPENDIX D FACTOR OF SAFETY CRITERIA 
 
The following criteria for the estimation of the factor of safety are presented by David G. Ullman 












Figure E.1 Personnel blast shield drawings by Paul Bradley (Bradley Metals CO Inc.)
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APPENDIX G PRESSURE TRANSDUCER READINGS (TEST SERIES A) 
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